Shi'a in the context of Caliph

Fiqh ([fiːk]; Arabic: فقه [fiqh]) is the term for Islamic jurisprudence. Fiqh is often described as the style of human understanding, research and practices of the sharia; that is, human understanding of the divine Islamic law as revealed in the Quran and the sunnah (the teachings and practices of the Islamic prophet Muhammad and his companions). Fiqh expands and develops Shariah through interpretation (ijtihad) of the Quran and Sunnah by Islamic jurists (ulama) and is implemented by the rulings (fatwa) of jurists on questions presented to them. Thus, whereas sharia is considered immutable and infallible by Muslims, fiqh is considered fallible and changeable. Fiqh deals with the observance of rituals, morals and social legislation in Islam as well as economic and political system. In the modern era, there are four prominent schools (madh'hab) of fiqh within Sunni practice, plus two (or three) within Shi'a practice. A person trained in fiqh is known as a faqīh (pl.: fuqaha).

Figuratively, fiqh means knowledge about Islamic legal rulings from their sources. Deriving religious rulings from their sources requires the mujtahid (an individual who exercises ijtihad) to have a deep understanding in the different discussions of jurisprudence.

Non-denominational Muslim (Arabic: مسلمون بلا طائفة) is a Muslim who does not belong to, does not self-identify with, or cannot be readily classified under one of the identifiable Islamic schools and branches. Such Muslims do not think of themselves as belonging to a denomination but rather as "just Muslims" or "non-denominational Muslims." Muslims who do not adhere to a sect are also known as non-sectarian Muslims.

While the majority of the population in the Middle East identify as either Sunni or Shi'a, a significant number of Muslims identify as non-denominational. According to a 2012 study by the Pew Research Center, Muslims who do not identify with a sect and identify as "just a Muslim" make up a majority of the Muslims in these countries: Kazakhstan (74%), Albania (65%), Kyrgyzstan (64%), Kosovo (58%), Indonesia (56%), Mali (55%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (54%), Uzbekistan (54%), and a plurality in four countries: Azerbaijan (45%), Russia (45%), Nigeria (42%), and Cameroon (40%). They are found primarily in Central Asia. Southeastern Europe also has a large number of Muslims who do not identify with a sect. Identification as "just a Muslim" is less prevalent in North Africa (median of 12%) and South Asia (median of 4%). In Lithuania, non-denominational Muslims fall into the category of "non-traditional religious communities", and are formally separated by law from Sunnis.

Ṣadr ad-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī, more commonly known as Mullā Ṣadrā (Persian: ملا صدرا; Arabic: صدر المتألهین; c. 1571/2 – c. 1635/40 CE / 980 – 1050 AH), was an Iranian Twelver Shi'i Islamic mystic, philosopher, theologian, and ‘Ālim who led the cultural renaissance in the country during the 17th century. According to Oliver Leaman, Mulla Sadra is arguably the single most important and influential philosopher in the Muslim world in the last four hundred years. Though not its founder, he is considered the master of the Illuminationist (or, Ishraghi or Ishraqi) school of Philosophy, a seminal figure who synthesized the many tracts of the Islamic Golden Age philosophies into what he called the Transcendent Theosophy or al-hikmah al-muta’āliyah.

Mulla Sadra brought "a new philosophical insight in dealing with the nature of reality" and created "a major transition from essentialism to existentialism" in Islamic philosophy, although his existentialism should not be too readily compared to Western existentialism. His was a question of existentialist cosmology as it pertained to God, and thus differs considerably from the individual, moral, and/or social, questions at the heart of Russian, French, German, or American Existentialism.

Iran has one of the highest urban population growth rates in the world. From 1950 to 2002, the urban proportion of the population increased from 27% to 60%. The United Nations (UN) predicts that by 2030 80% of the population will live in urban areas. Most internal migrants have settled near the cities of Tehran, Isfahan, Karaj, Ahvaz, Mashhad and Qom. Tehran, with a population of 8.7 million in 2016, is the largest city in Iran and is the nation's capital. Tehran is home to around 11% of Iran's population. It is the hub of Iran's communication and transport networks.

Mashhad, with a population of 4.2 million in 2019, is the second-largest Iranian city and the centre of the province of Razavi Khorasan. Mashhad is one of the holiest Shi'a cities in the world as it is the site of the Imam Reza shrine. It is the centre of tourism in Iran. Between 15 and 20 million pilgrims go to Imam Reza's shrine every year.

The Abbasid caliphs were the holders of the Islamic title of caliph who were members of the Abbasid dynasty, a branch of the Quraysh tribe descended from the uncle of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, Al-Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib.

The family came to power in the Abbasid Revolution in 748–750, supplanting the Umayyad Caliphate. They were the rulers of the Abbasid Caliphate, as well as the generally recognized ecumenical heads of Islam, until the 10th century, when the Shi'a Fatimid Caliphate (established in 909) and the Caliphate of Córdoba (established in 929) challenged their primacy. The political decline of the Abbasids had begun earlier, during the Anarchy at Samarra (861–870), which accelerated the fragmentation of the Muslim world into autonomous dynasties. The caliphs lost their temporal power in 936–946, first to a series of military strongmen and then to the Shi'a Buyid Emirs that seized control of Baghdad; the Buyids were in turn replaced by the Sunni Seljuk Turks in the mid-11th century, and Turkish rulers assumed the title of "Sultan" to denote their temporal authority. The Abbasid caliphs remained the generally recognized suzerains of Sunni Islam, however. In the mid-12th century, the Abbasids regained their independence from the Seljuks, but the revival of Abbasid power ended with the Sack of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258.

Satr (Arabic: ستر, lit. 'concealment') is a term used by the Isma'ili Shi'a for various periods in their history where the true imam was hidden (mastur) and represented through agents. These periods of concealment (dawr al-satr) might end with the renewed public manifestation of the imam, or continue until the present day. Entering into concealment did not mean that the line of imams stopped with the hidden imam; the Isma'ili concept is thus different from the concept of occultation (ghayba) as conceived by the Twelver Shi'a.

Ẓāhir or zaher (Arabic: ظاهر) is an Arabic term in some tafsir (interpretations of the Quran) for what is external and manifest. Certain esoteric interpretations of Islam maintain that the Quran has an exoteric or apparent meaning, known as zahir, but also an underlying esoteric meaning, known as batin (baten), which can be interpreted only by a figure of esoteric knowledge. For Shi'a Muslims, the Imam of Time alone can understand the esoteric meaning.

In Sufism, the actions of an individual are the zahir, and the intention in the heart is the batin. Zahir is the world of bodies whereas batin is the world of souls. Sufis believe in the purification of the batin by their spiritual guide to assure a zahir that follows Shariat.

Salat al-Tawbah; (Prayer of Repentance, also Namaz-e-Tawbah) is a Muslim prayer consisting of two rak'as (units or cycles of ritual prayer), according to Sunni tradition, or four rak'as, according to Shi'a tradition. The prayer is called for if a Muslim falls into sin—whether the sin is major or minor.

The National Iraqi Alliance (NIA or INA; Arabic: الائتلاف الوطني العراقي, romanized: Al-I’tilāf al-Waṭanī al-‘Irāqī), also known as the Watani List, was an Iraqi electoral coalition that contested the 2010 Iraqi legislative election. The Alliance was mainly composed of Shi'a Islamist parties. The alliance was created by the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (the at the time largest Shi'a party) to contest in the January 2005 and December 2005 under the name United Iraqi Alliance (UIA; Arabic: الائتلاف العراقي الموحد, romanized: Al-I’tilāf al-‘Irāqı al-Muwaḥḥad), when it included all Iraq's major Shi'a parties. The United Iraqi Alliance won both those of elections however later fell apart after several major parties (most notably the Sadr Movement) left the alliance due to disputes with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Supreme Council.

The component parties contested the 2009 provincial elections separately but later that year started negotiations to revive the list. In August 2009, they announced the creation of the National Iraqi Alliance for the 2010 parliamentary election, this time without Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Islamic Dawa Party, which formed the State of Law Coalition. Later that year the two lists would re-unite again, forming the National Alliance.

Fatimid coinage comes from the Fatimid Caliphate, an Isma'ili Shi'a empire that ruled large parts of North Africa, western Arabia, and the Levant, first from Tunisia (Ifriqiya) and then from Egypt. The coinage was minted after the typical pattern of Islamic coinage. The Fatimids were particularly known for the consistently high quality of their gold dinars, which proved a potent political tool in their conquest of Egypt and led to them being widely imitated by the Crusader states in the 12th century. Fatimid silver coinage (dirhams) on the other hand, although widely issued, declined in quality with the weakening of the Fatimid state, and has been mostly ignored in modern times. The Fatimids minted almost no copper coinage. Starting from designs imitating Abbasid coinage, adapted merely with slogans befitting the new regime and the names of the Fatimid caliphs, from the reign of Caliph al-Mu'izz on, Fatimid coinage included overtly Shi'a formulas and achieved a distinctive look, with concentric inscribed bands, that was maintained until the end of the dynasty.

In Zaydi Islam, the imamate (Arabic: إمامة, romanized: imama) is the supreme political and religious leadership position. In common with other Shi'a sects, it is reserved for Alids—i.e., descendants of Muhammad via Ali ibn Abi Talib and Fatimah. Unlike the Twelver or Isma'ili imamate, however, it was not hereditary and could be claimed by any qualified Alid; nor were its holders ascribed semi-divine attributes of infallibility and miracle-working. Necessary qualifications were a grounding in Islamic jurisprudence and a public call to allegiance, usually in the form of leadership of an uprising against unlawful authority. In practice, this meant there could be several Zaydi imams at the same time, even in the same region, or none at all. This resulted in the unique concept of a 'restricted' imamate for holders of political power who did not meet the scholarly credentials. Moreover, the personal nature of the imamate for a long time prevented the rise of persistent institutions, rendering the Zaydi states established in Yemen and Tabaristan unstable. As a result, the imamate often came to be passed down in hereditary fashion, especially as the Imams of Yemen abandoned Zaydi doctrines for Sunni ones in the 18th century.