Material conditional in the context of Vacuously true

Logic is the study of correct reasoning. It includes both formal and informal logic. Formal logic is the study of deductively valid inferences or logical truths. It examines how conclusions follow from premises based on the structure of arguments alone, independent of their topic and content. Informal logic is associated with informal fallacies, critical thinking, and argumentation theory. Informal logic examines arguments expressed in natural language whereas formal logic uses formal language. When used as a countable noun, the term "a logic" refers to a specific logical formal system that articulates a proof system. Logic plays a central role in many fields, such as philosophy, mathematics, computer science, and linguistics.

Logic studies arguments, which consist of a set of premises that leads to a conclusion. An example is the argument from the premises "it's Sunday" and "if it's Sunday then I don't have to work" leading to the conclusion "I don't have to work." Premises and conclusions express propositions or claims that can be true or false. An important feature of propositions is their internal structure. For example, complex propositions are made up of simpler propositions linked by logical vocabulary like ${\displaystyle \land }$ (and) or ${\displaystyle \to }$ (if...then). Simple propositions also have parts, like "Sunday" or "work" in the example. The truth of a proposition usually depends on the meanings of all of its parts. However, this is not the case for logically true propositions. They are true only because of their logical structure independent of the specific meanings of the individual parts.

In propositional logic, modus ponens (/ˈmoʊdəs ˈpoʊnɛnz/; MP), also known as modus ponendo ponens (from Latin 'mode that by affirming affirms'), implication elimination, or affirming the antecedent, is a deductive argument form and rule of inference. It can be summarized as "P implies Q. P is true. Therefore, Q must also be true."

Modus ponens is a mixed hypothetical syllogism and is closely related to another valid form of argument, modus tollens. Both have apparently similar but invalid forms: affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent. Constructive dilemma is the disjunctive version of modus ponens.

Propositions are the meanings of declarative sentences, objects of beliefs, and bearers of truth values. They explain how different sentences, like the English "Snow is white" and the German "Schnee ist weiß", can have identical meaning by expressing the same proposition. Similarly, they ground the fact that different people can share a belief by being directed at the same content. True propositions describe the world as it is, while false ones fail to do so. Researchers distinguish types of propositions by their informational content and mode of assertion, such as the contrasts between affirmative and negative propositions, between universal and existential propositions, and between categorical and conditional propositions.

Many theories of the nature and roles of propositions have been proposed. Realists argue that propositions form part of reality, a view rejected by anti-realists. Non-reductive realists understand propositions as a unique kind of entity, whereas reductive realists analyze them in terms of other entities. One proposal sees them as sets of possible worlds, reflecting the idea that understanding a proposition involves grasping the circumstances under which it would be true. A different suggestion focuses on the individuals and concepts to which a proposition refers, defining propositions as structured entities composed of these constituents. Other accounts characterize propositions as specific kinds of properties, relations, or states of affairs. Philosophers also debate whether propositions are abstract objects outside space and time, psychological entities dependent on mental activity, or linguistic entities grounded in language. Paradoxes challenge the different theories of propositions, such as the liar's paradox. The study of propositions has its roots in ancient philosophy, with influential contributions from Aristotle and the Stoics, and later from William of Ockham, Gottlob Frege, and Bertrand Russell.

A consequent is the second half of a hypothetical proposition. In the standard form of such a proposition, it is the part that follows "then". In an implication, if P implies Q, then P is called the antecedent and Q is called the consequent. In some contexts, the consequent is called the apodosis.

In logic and related fields such as mathematics and philosophy, "if and only if" (often shortened as "iff") is paraphrased by the biconditional, a logical connective between statements. The biconditional is true in two cases, where either both statements are true or both are false. The connective is biconditional (a statement of material equivalence), and can be likened to the standard material conditional ("only if", equal to "if ... then") combined with its reverse ("if"); hence the name. The result is that the truth of either one of the connected statements requires the truth of the other (i.e. either both statements are true, or both are false), though it is controversial whether the connective thus defined is properly rendered by the English "if and only if"—with its pre-existing meaning. For example, P if and only if Q means that P is true whenever Q is true, and the only case in which P is true is if Q is also true, whereas in the case of P if Q, there could be other scenarios where P is true and Q is false.

In writing, phrases commonly used as alternatives to P "if and only if" Q include: Q is necessary and sufficient for P, for P it is necessary and sufficient that Q, P is equivalent (or materially equivalent) to Q (compare with material implication), P precisely if Q, P precisely (or exactly) when Q, P exactly in case Q, and P just in case Q. Some authors regard "iff" as unsuitable in formal writing; others consider it a "borderline case" and tolerate its use. In logical formulae, logical symbols, such as ${\displaystyle \leftrightarrow }$ and ${\displaystyle \Leftrightarrow }$, are used instead of these phrases; see § Notation below.

Constructive dilemma is a valid rule of inference of propositional logic. It is the inference that, if P implies Q and R implies S and either P or R is true, then either Q or S has to be true. In sum, if two conditionals are true and at least one of their antecedents is, then at least one of their consequents must be too. Constructive dilemma is the disjunctive version of modus ponens, whereas destructive dilemma is the disjunctive version of modus tollens. The constructive dilemma rule can be stated:

where the rule is that whenever instances of "${\displaystyle P\to Q}$", "${\displaystyle R\to S}$", and "${\displaystyle P\lor R}$" appear on lines of a proof, "${\displaystyle Q\lor S}$" can be placed on a subsequent line.

Propositional logic is a branch of logic. It is also called statement logic, sentential calculus, propositional calculus, sentential logic, or sometimes zeroth-order logic. Sometimes, it is called first-order propositional logic to contrast it with System F, but it should not be confused with first-order logic. It deals with propositions (which can be true or false) and relations between propositions, including the construction of arguments based on them. Compound propositions are formed by connecting propositions by logical connectives representing the truth functions of conjunction, disjunction, implication, biconditional, and negation. Some sources include other connectives, as in the table below.

Unlike first-order logic, propositional logic does not deal with non-logical objects, predicates about them, or quantifiers. However, all the machinery of propositional logic is included in first-order logic and higher-order logics. In this sense, propositional logic is the foundation of first-order logic and higher-order logic.

In logic, a strict conditional (symbol: ${\displaystyle \Box }$, or ⥽) is a conditional governed by a modal operator, that is, a logical connective of modal logic. It is logically equivalent to the material conditional of classical logic, combined with the necessity operator from modal logic. For any two propositions p and q, the formula p → q says that p materially implies q while ${\displaystyle \Box (p\rightarrow q)}$ says that p strictly implies q. Strict conditionals are the result of Clarence Irving Lewis's attempt to find a conditional for logic that can adequately express indicative conditionals in natural language. They have also been used in studying Molinist theology.

Counterfactual conditionals (also contrafactual, subjunctive or X-marked) are conditional sentences which discuss what would have been true under different circumstances, e.g. "If Peter believed in ghosts, he would be afraid to be here." Counterfactuals are contrasted with indicatives, which are generally restricted to discussing open possibilities. Counterfactuals are characterized grammatically by their use of fake tense morphology, which some languages use in combination with other kinds of morphology including aspect and mood.

Counterfactuals are one of the most studied phenomena in philosophical logic, formal semantics, and philosophy of language. They were first discussed as a problem for the material conditional analysis of conditionals, which treats them all as trivially true. Starting in the 1960s, philosophers and linguists developed the now-classic possible world approach, in which a counterfactual's truth hinges on its consequent holding at certain possible worlds where its antecedent holds. More recent formal analyses have treated them using tools such as causal models and dynamic semantics. Other research has addressed their metaphysical, psychological, and grammatical underpinnings, while applying some of the resultant insights to fields including history, marketing, and epidemiology.

The paradoxes of material implication are a group of classically true formulae involving material conditionals whose translations into natural language are intuitively false when the conditional is translated with English words such as "implies" or "if ... then ...". They are sometimes phrased as arguments, since they are easily turned into arguments with modus ponens: if it is true that "if ${\displaystyle P}$ then ${\displaystyle Q}$" (${\displaystyle P\rightarrow Q}$), then from that together with ${\displaystyle P}$, one may argue for ${\displaystyle Q}$. Among them are the following:

A material conditional formula ${\displaystyle P\rightarrow Q}$ is true unless ${\displaystyle P}$ is true and ${\displaystyle Q}$ is false; it is synonymous with "either P is false, or Q is true, or both". This gives rise to vacuous truths such as, "if 2+2=5, then this Wikipedia article is accurate", which is true regardless of the contents of this article, because the antecedent is false. Given that such problematic consequences follow from an extremely popular and widely accepted model of reasoning, namely the material implication in classical logic, they are called paradoxes. They demonstrate a mismatch between classical logic and robust intuitions about meaning and reasoning.

In logic and mathematics, contraposition, or transposition, refers to the inference of going from a conditional statement into its logically equivalent contrapositive, and an associated proof method known as § Proof by contrapositive. The contrapositive of a statement has its antecedent and consequent negated and swapped.

Conditional statement ${\displaystyle P\rightarrow Q}$. In formulas: the contrapositive of ${\displaystyle P\rightarrow Q}$ is ${\displaystyle \neg Q\rightarrow \neg P}$.