Anti-realism in the context of "Declarative sentence"

Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately. This makes moral realism a non-nihilist form of ethical cognitivism (which accepts that ethical sentences express propositions and can therefore be true or false) with an ontological orientation, standing in opposition to all forms of moral anti-realism and moral skepticism, including ethical subjectivism (which denies that moral propositions refer to objective facts), error theory (which denies that any moral propositions are true), and non-cognitivism (which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all). Moral realism's two main subdivisions are ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism.

Most philosophers claim that moral realism dates at least to Plato as a philosophical doctrine and that it is a fully defensible form of moral doctrine. A 2009 survey involving 3,226 respondents from mostly English-speaking universities, including mostly faculty members, PhDs and graduate students, found that 56% accept or lean toward moral realism (28%: anti-realism; 16%: other). A 2020 study found that 62.1% accept or lean toward realism. Some notable examples of robust moral realists include David Brink, John McDowell, Peter Railton, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Michael Smith, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer-Landau, G. E. Moore, John Finnis, Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon, Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, and Peter Singer. Norman Geras has argued that Karl Marx was a moral realist. Moral realism's various philosophical and practical applications have been studied.

The philosophy of perception is concerned with the nature of perceptual experience and the status of perceptual data, in particular how they relate to beliefs about, or knowledge of, the world. Any explicit account of perception requires a commitment to one of a variety of ontological or metaphysical views. Philosophers distinguish internalist accounts, which assume that perceptions of objects, and knowledge or beliefs about them, are aspects of an individual's mind, and externalist accounts, which state that they constitute real aspects of the world external to the individual. The position of naïve realism—the 'everyday' impression of physical objects constituting what is perceived—is to some extent contradicted by the occurrence of perceptual illusions and hallucinations and the relativity of perceptual experience as well as certain insights in science. Realist conceptions include phenomenalism and direct and indirect realism. Anti-realist conceptions include idealism and skepticism. Recent philosophical work have expanded on the philosophical features of perception by going beyond the single paradigm of vision (for instance, by investigating the uniqueness of olfaction).

Ethical non-naturalism (or moral non-naturalism) is the meta-ethical view which claims that:

1. Ethical sentences express propositions.
2. Some such propositions are true.
3. Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of human opinion.
4. These moral features of the world are not reducible to any set of non-moral features.

This makes ethical non-naturalism a non-definist form of moral realism, which is in turn a form of cognitivism. Ethical non-naturalism stands in opposition to ethical naturalism, which claims that moral terms and properties are reducible to non-moral terms and properties, as well as to all forms of moral anti-realism, including ethical subjectivism (which denies that moral propositions refer to objective facts), error theory (which denies that any moral propositions are true), and non-cognitivism (which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all).

Sir Michael Anthony Eardley Dummett FBA (/ˈdʌmɪt/; 27 June 1925 – 27 December 2011) was an English academic described as "among the most significant British philosophers of the last century and a leading campaigner for racial tolerance and equality." He was, until 1992, Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford. He wrote on the history of analytic philosophy, notably as an interpreter of Frege, and made original contributions particularly in the philosophies of mathematics, logic, language and metaphysics.

He was known for his work on truth and meaning and their implications to debates between realism and anti-realism, a term he helped to popularize. In mathematical logic, he developed an intermediate logic, a logical system intermediate between classical logic and intuitionistic logic that had already been studied by Kurt Gödel: the Gödel–Dummett logic. In voting theory, he devised the Quota Borda system of proportional voting, based on the Borda count, and conjectured the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem together with Robin Farquharson; he also devised the condition of proportionality for solid coalitions. Besides his main work in analytic philosophy, he also wrote extensively on the history of card games, particularly on tarot card games.

Consensus reality is the generally agreed-upon version of reality within a community or society, shaped by shared experiences and understandings. This understanding arises from the inherent differences in individual perspectives or subjectivities relating to knowledge or ontology, leading to uncertainties about what is real. While various viewpoints exist, people strive to establish a consensus, serving as a pragmatic guide for social norms. The term carries both positive and negative connotations, as it is viewed critically by anti-realist theorists but recognized for its practical benefits in fostering shared beliefs. Consensus reality differs from consensual reality, with the former representing mutual agreement about what is true. Artists and thinkers have challenged consensus reality, aiming to disrupt established norms and question the authenticity of the world's reality.

Children have sometimes been described or viewed as "inexperience[d] with consensus reality," though are described as such with the expectation that their perspective will progressively form closer to the consensus reality of their society as they age.