Gottlob Frege in the context of "Analytic tradition"

Bertrand Arthur William Russell, 3rd Earl Russell (18 May 1872 – 2 February 1970), was a British philosopher, logician, mathematician, and public intellectual. He influenced mathematics, logic, set theory, and various areas of analytic philosophy.

He was one of the early 20th century's prominent logicians and a founder of analytic philosophy, along with his predecessor Gottlob Frege, his friend and colleague G. E. Moore, and his student and protégé Ludwig Wittgenstein. Russell with Moore led the British "revolt against idealism". Together with his former teacher Alfred North Whitehead, Russell wrote Principia Mathematica, a milestone in the development of classical logic and a major attempt to reduce the whole of mathematics to logic (see logicism). Russell's article "On Denoting" has been considered a "paradigm of philosophy".

Philosophy of language is the philosophical study of the nature of language. It investigates the relationship between language, language users, and the world. Investigations may include inquiry into the nature of meaning, intentionality, reference, the constitution of sentences, concepts, learning, and thought.

Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell were pivotal figures in analytic philosophy's "linguistic turn". These writers were followed by Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus), the Vienna Circle, logical positivists, and Willard Van Orman Quine.

Analytic philosophy is a broad movement and methodology within contemporary Western philosophy, especially anglophone philosophy, focused on: analysis as a philosophical method; clarity of prose; rigor in arguments; and making use of formal logic, mathematics, and to a lesser degree the natural sciences. It is further characterized by the linguistic turn, or a concern with language and meaning. Analytic philosophy has developed several new branches of philosophy and logic, notably philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science, modern predicate logic and mathematical logic.

The proliferation of analysis in philosophy began around the turn of the 20th century and has been dominant since the latter half of the 20th century. Central figures in its historical development are Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Other important figures in its history include Franz Brentano, the logical positivists (especially Rudolf Carnap), the ordinary language philosophers, W. V. O. Quine, and Karl Popper. After the decline of logical positivism, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and others led a revival in metaphysics.

Propositions are the meanings of declarative sentences, objects of beliefs, and bearers of truth values. They explain how different sentences, like the English "Snow is white" and the German "Schnee ist weiß", can have identical meaning by expressing the same proposition. Similarly, they ground the fact that different people can share a belief by being directed at the same content. True propositions describe the world as it is, while false ones fail to do so. Researchers distinguish types of propositions by their informational content and mode of assertion, such as the contrasts between affirmative and negative propositions, between universal and existential propositions, and between categorical and conditional propositions.

Many theories of the nature and roles of propositions have been proposed. Realists argue that propositions form part of reality, a view rejected by anti-realists. Non-reductive realists understand propositions as a unique kind of entity, whereas reductive realists analyze them in terms of other entities. One proposal sees them as sets of possible worlds, reflecting the idea that understanding a proposition involves grasping the circumstances under which it would be true. A different suggestion focuses on the individuals and concepts to which a proposition refers, defining propositions as structured entities composed of these constituents. Other accounts characterize propositions as specific kinds of properties, relations, or states of affairs. Philosophers also debate whether propositions are abstract objects outside space and time, psychological entities dependent on mental activity, or linguistic entities grounded in language. Paradoxes challenge the different theories of propositions, such as the liar's paradox. The study of propositions has its roots in ancient philosophy, with influential contributions from Aristotle and the Stoics, and later from William of Ockham, Gottlob Frege, and Bertrand Russell.

Verificationism, also known as the verification principle or the verifiability criterion of meaning, is a doctrine in philosophy and the philosophy of language which holds that a declarative sentence is cognitively meaningful only if it is either analytic or tautological (true or false in virtue of its logical form and definitions) or at least in principle verifiable by experience. On this view, many traditional statements of metaphysics, theology, and some of ethics and aesthetics are said to lack truth value or factual content, even though they may still function as expressions of emotions or attitudes rather than as genuine assertions. Verificationism was typically formulated as an empiricist criterion of cognitive significance: a proposed test for distinguishing meaningful, truth-apt sentences from "nonsense".

As a self-conscious movement, verificationism was a central thesis of logical positivism (or logical empiricism), developed in the 1920s and 1930s by members of the Vienna Circle and their allies in early analytic philosophy. Drawing on earlier empiricism and positivism (especially David Hume, Auguste Comte and Ernst Mach), on pragmatism (notably C. S. Peirce and William James), and on the logical and semantic innovations of Gottlob Frege and the early Wittgenstein, these philosophers sought a "scientific" conception of philosophy in which meaningful discourse would either consist in empirical claims ultimately testable by observation or in analytic truths of logic and mathematics. The verification principle was intended to explain why many traditional metaphysical disputes seemed irresolvable, to demarcate science from pseudo-science and speculative metaphysics, and to vindicate the special status of the natural sciences by taking empirical testability as the paradigm of serious inquiry.

The Vienna Circle (German: Wiener Kreis) of logical empiricism was a group of elite philosophers and scientists drawn from the natural and social sciences, logic and mathematics who met regularly from 1924 to 1936 at the University of Vienna, chaired by Moritz Schlick. The Vienna Circle had a profound influence on 20th-century philosophy, especially philosophy of science and analytic philosophy.

The philosophical position of the Vienna Circle was called logical empiricism (German: logischer Empirismus), logical positivism or neopositivism. It was influenced by Ernst Mach, David Hilbert, French conventionalism (Henri Poincaré and Pierre Duhem), Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Albert Einstein. The Vienna Circle was pluralistic and committed to the ideals of the Enlightenment. It was unified by the aim of making philosophy scientific with the help of modern logic. Main topics were foundational debates in the natural and social sciences, logic and mathematics; the modernization of empiricism by modern logic; the search for an empiricist criterion of meaning; the critique of metaphysics and the unification of the sciences in the unity of science.

In the philosophy of language, the distinction between sense and reference was an idea of the German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege in 1892 (in his paper "On Sense and Reference"; German: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung"), reflecting the two ways he believed a singular term may have meaning.

The reference (or "referent"; Bedeutung) of a proper name is the object it means or indicates (bedeuten), whereas its sense (Sinn) is what the name expresses. The reference of a sentence is its extension, whereas its sense is the thought that it expresses. Frege justified the distinction in a number of ways.

In semantics, mathematical logic and related disciplines, the principle of compositionality is the principle that the meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meanings of its constituent expressions and the rules used to combine them. The principle is also called Frege's principle, because Gottlob Frege is widely credited for the first modern formulation of it. However, the principle has never been explicitly stated by Frege, and arguably it was already assumed by George Boole decades before Frege's work.

The principle of compositionality (also known as semantic compositionalism) is highly debated in linguistics. Among its most challenging problems there are the issues of contextuality, the non-compositionality of idiomatic expressions, and the non-compositionality of quotations.

Kurt Friedrich Gödel (/ˈɡɜːrdəl/ GUR-dəl; German: [ˈkʊʁt ˈɡøːdl̩] ; April 28, 1906 – January 14, 1978) was a logician, mathematician, and philosopher. Considered along with Aristotle and Gottlob Frege to be one of the most significant logicians in history, Gödel profoundly influenced scientific and philosophical thinking in the 20th century (at a time when Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead, and David Hilbert were using logic and set theory to investigate the foundations of mathematics), building on earlier work by Frege, Richard Dedekind, and Georg Cantor.

Gödel's discoveries in the foundations of mathematics led to the proof of his completeness theorem in 1929 as part of his dissertation to earn a doctorate at the University of Vienna, and the publication of Gödel's incompleteness theorems two years later, in 1931. The incompleteness theorems address limitations of formal axiomatic systems. In particular, they imply that a formal axiomatic system satisfying certain technical conditions cannot decide the truth value of all statements about the natural numbers, and cannot prove that it is itself consistent. To prove this, Gödel developed a technique now known as Gödel numbering, which codes formal expressions as natural numbers.