Clitomachus or Cleitomachus (Ancient Greek: Κλειτόμαχος, Kleitómakhos; 187/6–110/9 BC) was a Greek philosopher, originally from Carthage, who came to Athens in 163/2 BC and studied philosophy under Carneades. He became head of the Academy around 127/6 BC. He was an Academic skeptic like his master. Nothing survives of his writings, which were dedicated to making known the views of Carneades, but Cicero made use of them for some of his works.
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Clitomachus (philosopher) in the context of Philo of Larissa
Philo of Larissa (Greek: Φίλων ὁ Λαρισαῖος Philon ho Larisaios; 159/8–84/3 BC) was a Greek philosopher. It is very probable that his actual name was "Philio."
He was a pupil of Clitomachus, whom he succeeded as head of the Academy. During the Mithridatic Wars which would see the destruction of the Academy, he travelled to Rome where Cicero heard him lecture. None of his writings survive. He was an Academic sceptic, like Clitomachus and Carneades before him, but he offered a more moderate view of skepticism than that of his teachers, permitting provisional beliefs without certainty.
Clitomachus (philosopher) in the context of Carneades
Carneades (/kɑːrˈniːədiːz/; Greek: Καρνεάδης, Karneadēs, "of Carnea"; 214/3–129/8 BC) was a Greek philosopher, perhaps the most prominent head of the Skeptical Academy in Ancient Greece. He was born in Cyrene. By the year 159 BC, he had begun to attack many previous dogmatic doctrines, especially Stoicism and even the Epicureans, whom previous skeptics had spared.
As scholarch (leader) of the Academy, he was one of three philosophers sent to Rome in 155 BC where his lectures on the uncertainty of justice caused consternation among leading politicians. He left no writings. His ideas were passed on to us through his successor Clitomachus whose own books were lost but relayed to us indirectly in the writings of Cicero and Sextus Empiricus. He seems to have doubted the ability not just of the senses but of reason too in acquiring truth. His skepticism was, however, moderated by the belief that we can, nevertheless, ascertain probabilities (not in the sense of statistical probability, but in the sense of persuasiveness) of truth, to enable us to act.