Strategy in the context of "Political strategy"

⭐ In the context of political consulting, strategy is considered…

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⭐ Core Definition: Strategy

Strategy (from Greek στρατηγία stratΔ“gia, "troop leadership; office of general, command, generalship") is a general plan to achieve one or more long-term or overall goals under conditions of uncertainty. In the sense of the "art of the general", which included several subsets of skills including military tactics, siegecraft, logistics etc., the term came into use in the 6th century C.E. in Eastern Roman terminology, and was translated into Western vernacular languages only in the 18th century. From then until the 20th century, the word "strategy" came to denote "a comprehensive way to try to pursue political ends, including the threat or actual use of force, in a dialectic of wills" in a military conflict, in which both adversaries interact.

Strategy is important because the resources available to achieve goals are usually limited. Strategy generally involves setting goals and priorities, determining actions to achieve the goals, and mobilizing resources to execute the actions. A strategy describes how the ends (goals) will be achieved by the means (resources). Strategy can be intended or can emerge as a pattern of activity as the organization adapts to its environment or competes. It involves activities such as strategic planning and strategic thinking.

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πŸ‘‰ Strategy in the context of Political strategy

Political consulting is a form of consulting that consists primarily of advising and assisting political campaigns. Although the most important role of political consultants is arguably the development and production of mass media (largely television, direct mail, and digital advertising), consultants advise campaigns on many other activities, ranging from opposition research and voter polling, to field strategy and get out the vote efforts.

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Strategy in the context of Geostrategy

Geostrategy, a subfield of geopolitics, is a type of foreign policy guided principally by geographical factors as they inform, constrain, or affect political and military planning. As with all strategies, geostrategy is concerned with matching means to ends. Strategy is as intertwined with geography as geography is with nationhood, or as Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan state it, "[geography is] the mother of strategy."

Geostrategists, as distinct from geopoliticians, approach geopolitics from a nationalist point of view. Geostrategies are relevant principally to the context in which they were devised: the strategist's nation, the historically rooted national impulses, the strength of the country's resources, the scope of the country's goals, the political geography of the time period, and the technological factors that affect military, political, economic, and cultural engagement. Geostrategy can function prescriptively, advocating foreign policy based on geographic and historical factors, analytically, describing how foreign policy is shaped by geography and history, or predictively, projecting a country's future foreign policy decisions and outcomes.

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Strategy in the context of Nonviolence

Nonviolence is the practice of working for social change without causing harm to others, under any condition. It may come from the belief that hurting people, animals and/or the environment is unnecessary to achieve an outcome, and it may refer to a general philosophy of abstention from violence. It may be based on moral, religious or spiritual principles. The reasons for it may be strategic or pragmatic; failure to distinguish between the two can lead to distortion in the concept's meaning and effectiveness, which can subsequently result in confusion. Although both principled and pragmatic nonviolent approaches preach for nonviolence, they may have distinct motives, goals, philosophies, and techniques. However, rather than debating the best practice between the two approaches, both can indicate alternative paths for those who do not want to use violence.

Nonviolence has "active" or "activist" elements, in that believers generally accept the need for nonviolence as a means to achieve political and social change. Thus, for example, Tolstoyan and Gandhian philosophies on nonviolence seek social change while rejecting the use of violence, seeing nonviolent action (also called civil resistance) as an alternative to either passive acceptance of oppression or armed struggle against it. In general, advocates of an activist philosophy of nonviolence use diverse methods in their campaigns for social change, including critical forms of education and persuasion, mass noncooperation, civil disobedience, nonviolent direct action, constructive program, and social, political, cultural and economic forms of intervention.

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Strategy in the context of Automated planning and scheduling

Automated planning and scheduling, sometimes denoted as simply AI planning, is a branch of artificial intelligence that concerns the realization of strategies or action sequences, typically for execution by intelligent agents, autonomous robots and unmanned vehicles. Unlike classical control and classification problems, the solutions are complex and must be discovered and optimized in multidimensional space. Planning is also related to decision theory.

In known environments with available models, planning can be done offline. Solutions can be found and evaluated prior to execution. In dynamically unknown environments, the strategy often needs to be revised online. Models and policies must be adapted. Solutions usually resort to iterative trial and error processes commonly seen in artificial intelligence. These include dynamic programming, reinforcement learning and combinatorial optimization. Languages used to describe planning and scheduling are often called action languages.

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Strategy in the context of Action plan

An action plan is a detailed plan outlining actions needed to reach one or more goals. Alternatively, it can be defined as a "sequence of steps that must be taken, or activities that must be performed well, for a strategy to succeed".

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Strategy in the context of United States Army War College

The United States Army War College (USAWC) is a U.S. Army staff college in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, with a Carlisle postal address, on the 500-acre (2Β km) campus of the historic Carlisle Barracks. It provides graduate-level instruction to senior military officers, government officials, and civilians to prepare them for senior leadership assignments and responsibilities. Each year, a number of Army colonels and lieutenant colonels are considered by a board for admission. Approximately 800 students attend at any one time, half in a two-year-long distance learning program, and the other half in an on-campus, full-time resident program lasting ten months. Upon completion, the college grants its graduates a master's degree in Strategic Studies (MSS).

The Army War College is a split-functional institution. Emphasis is placed on research and students are also instructed in leadership, strategy, and joint-service/international operations. It is one of the senior service colleges including the Naval War College and the USAF Air War College. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Defense operates the National War College.

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Strategy in the context of Artillery of World War I

The artillery of World War I, improved over that used in previous wars, influenced the tactics, operations, and strategies that were used by the belligerents. This led to trench warfare and encouraged efforts to break the resulting stalemate at the front. World War I raised artillery to a new level of importance on the battlefield.

The First World War saw many developments in artillery warfare. Artillery could now fire the new high explosive shells, and throw them farther and at a higher rate of fire. Because of this, enemies in trenches were no longer always safe, and could constantly be fired upon. In some areas, artillery concentration was common, with several guns firing onto an area such as a line of trenches, each gun firing several rounds per minute for hours. Artillery barrages were also used to divert the enemy's attention from the site of attack before a battle. Paths behind the lines were also fired on so that enemy reinforcements could not safely reach the front lines.

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Strategy in the context of Xiang Yu

Xiang Yu (c. 232 – c. January 202Β BC), born Xiang Ji, was a Chinese warlord who founded and led the short-lived kingdom-state of Western Chu during the interregnum period between the Qin and Han dynasties known as the Chu–Han Contention (206–202 BC). A nobleman of the former state of Chu, Xiang Yu rebelled against the Qin dynasty under the command of his uncle Xiang Liang, and was granted the title of "Duke of Lu" (ι­―ε…¬) by King Huai II of the restoring Chu state in 208Β BC. The following year, he led an outnumbered Chu army to victory at the Battle of Julu against the Qin armies led by Zhang Han. After the fall of Qin, Xiang Yu divided the country into a federacy of Eighteen Kingdoms, among which he was self-titled as the "Hegemon-King of Western Chu" (θ₯Ώζ₯šιœΈηŽ‹) and ruled a vast region spanning central and eastern China, with Pengcheng as his capital.

Although a formidable warrior and tactician, Xiang Yu was poor in both diplomacy and strategy, especially after dismissing his own adviser Fan Zeng. He was later outcompeted by his main rival Liu Bang during the massive civil war among the rebel kingdoms, which concluded with his eventual defeat and suicide in a last stand at the Battle of Gaixia. The demise of Xiang Yu allowed Liu Bang to subsequently become the founding emperor of the newly established Han dynasty, which is widely regarded as a golden age in Chinese history.

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Strategy in the context of Siege of Rhodes (305–304 BC)

The siege of Rhodes in 305–304 BC was one of the most notable sieges of antiquity, when Demetrius Poliorcetes, son of Antigonus I, besieged Rhodes in an attempt to make it abandon its neutrality and end its close relationship with Ptolemy I.

The attempt ultimately proved unsuccessful, but the scale of the siege, along with the logistical, strategic, and engineering efforts of Demetrius Poliorcetes, cemented his reputation as a military engineer and city conqueror. The significant defense mounted by the Rhodians was also noted by the sources, and thus the siege gradually established itself, within Greek and Roman antiquity, as one of the most notable sieges of their shared past.

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