Stoics in the context of "Academic skeptic"

Academic skepticism was the philosophy of the skeptical period of the Academy dating from around 266 BCE, when Arcesilaus became scholarch, until around 90 BCE, when Antiochus of Ascalon rejected skepticism, although individual philosophers, such as Favorinus and his teacher Plutarch, continued to defend skepticism after this date. Unlike the existing school of skepticism, the Pyrrhonists, they maintained that knowledge of things is impossible. Ideas or notions are never true; nevertheless, there are degrees of plausibility, and hence degrees of belief, which allow one to act. The school was characterized by its attacks on the Stoics, particularly their dogma that convincing impressions led to true knowledge. The most important Academics were Arcesilaus, Carneades, and Philo of Larissa. The most extensive ancient source of information about Academic skepticism is Academica, written by the Academic skeptic philosopher Cicero.

Divinity (from Latin divinitas) refers to the quality, presence, or nature of that which is divine—a term that, before the rise of monotheism, evoked a broad and dynamic field of sacred power. In the ancient world, divinity was not limited to a single deity or abstract ideal but was recognized in multiple forms: as a radiant attribute possessed by gods, as a vital force cushioning nature, and even as a quality glimpsed in extraordinary humans, laws, or acts. The Latin divinitas and its Greek counterparts (theiotēs, theion) conveyed something both immanent and awe-inspiring: a presence that could be felt in thunder, justice, ecstasy, fate, or beauty.

Among the Greeks and Romans, divinity was not confined to a rigid theological system. Gods, heroes, and even emperors might be described as partaking in divinity, just as natural forces or virtue could be seen as expressions of divine essence. Philosophers such as Plato and the Stoics used the term to refer to the soul of the cosmos or the rational order of the universe, while ritual and myth depicted the divine in vivid ways. To call something divine was not always to worship it as a god, but to acknowledge its participation in a higher, sacred order.

Propositions are the meanings of declarative sentences, objects of beliefs, and bearers of truth values. They explain how different sentences, like the English "Snow is white" and the German "Schnee ist weiß", can have identical meaning by expressing the same proposition. Similarly, they ground the fact that different people can share a belief by being directed at the same content. True propositions describe the world as it is, while false ones fail to do so. Researchers distinguish types of propositions by their informational content and mode of assertion, such as the contrasts between affirmative and negative propositions, between universal and existential propositions, and between categorical and conditional propositions.

Many theories of the nature and roles of propositions have been proposed. Realists argue that propositions form part of reality, a view rejected by anti-realists. Non-reductive realists understand propositions as a unique kind of entity, whereas reductive realists analyze them in terms of other entities. One proposal sees them as sets of possible worlds, reflecting the idea that understanding a proposition involves grasping the circumstances under which it would be true. A different suggestion focuses on the individuals and concepts to which a proposition refers, defining propositions as structured entities composed of these constituents. Other accounts characterize propositions as specific kinds of properties, relations, or states of affairs. Philosophers also debate whether propositions are abstract objects outside space and time, psychological entities dependent on mental activity, or linguistic entities grounded in language. Paradoxes challenge the different theories of propositions, such as the liar's paradox. The study of propositions has its roots in ancient philosophy, with influential contributions from Aristotle and the Stoics, and later from William of Ockham, Gottlob Frege, and Bertrand Russell.