Soundness in the context of Consistent

Deductive reasoning is the process of drawing valid inferences. An inference is valid if its conclusion follows logically from its premises, meaning that it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. For example, the inference from the premises "all men are mortal" and "Socrates is a man" to the conclusion "Socrates is mortal" is deductively valid. An argument is sound if it is valid and all its premises are true. One approach defines deduction in terms of the intentions of the author: they have to intend for the premises to offer deductive support to the conclusion. With the help of this modification, it is possible to distinguish valid from invalid deductive reasoning: it is invalid if the author's belief about the deductive support is false, but even invalid deductive reasoning is a form of deductive reasoning.

Deductive logic studies under what conditions an argument is valid. According to the semantic approach, an argument is valid if there is no possible interpretation of the argument whereby its premises are true and its conclusion is false. The syntactic approach, by contrast, focuses on rules of inference, that is, schemas of drawing a conclusion from a set of premises based only on their logical form. There are various rules of inference, such as modus ponens and modus tollens. Invalid deductive arguments, which do not follow a rule of inference, are called formal fallacies. Rules of inference are definitory rules and contrast with strategic rules, which specify what inferences one needs to draw in order to arrive at an intended conclusion.

A premise or premiss is a proposition—a true or false declarative statement—used in an argument to prove the truth of another proposition called the conclusion. Arguments consist of a set of premises and a conclusion.

An argument is meaningful for its conclusion only when all of its premises are true. If one or more premises are false, the argument says nothing about whether the conclusion is true or false. For instance, a false premise on its own does not justify rejecting an argument's conclusion; to assume otherwise is a logical fallacy called denying the antecedent. One way to prove that a proposition is false is to formulate a sound argument with a conclusion that negates that proposition.

In logic and philosophy, a formal fallacy is a pattern of reasoning with a flaw in its logical structure (the logical relationship between the premises and the conclusion). In other words:

• It is a pattern of reasoning in which the conclusion may not be true even if all the premises are true.
• It is a pattern of reasoning in which the premises do not entail the conclusion.
• It is a pattern of reasoning that is invalid.
• It is a fallacy in which deduction goes wrong, and is no longer a logical process.

A formal fallacy is contrasted with an informal fallacy which may have a valid logical form and yet be unsound because one or more premises are false. A formal fallacy, however, may have a true premise, but a false conclusion. The term 'logical fallacy' is sometimes used in everyday conversation, and refers to a formal fallacy.

In deductive logic, a consistent theory is one that does not lead to a logical contradiction. A theory ${\displaystyle T}$ is consistent if there is no formula ${\displaystyle \varphi }$ such that both ${\displaystyle \varphi }$ and its negation ${\displaystyle \lnot \varphi }$ are elements of the set of consequences of ${\displaystyle T}$. Let ${\displaystyle A}$ be a set of closed sentences (informally "axioms") and ${\displaystyle \langle A\rangle }$ the set of closed sentences provable from ${\displaystyle A}$ under some (specified, possibly implicitly) formal deductive system. The set of axioms ${\displaystyle A}$ is consistent when there is no formula ${\displaystyle \varphi }$ such that ${\displaystyle \varphi \in \langle A\rangle }$ and ${\displaystyle \lnot \varphi \in \langle A\rangle }$. A trivial theory (i.e., one which proves every sentence in the language of the theory) is clearly inconsistent. Conversely, in an explosive formal system (e.g., classical or intuitionistic propositional or first-order logics) every inconsistent theory is trivial. Consistency of a theory is a syntactic notion, whose semantic counterpart is satisfiability. A theory is satisfiable if it has a model, i.e., there exists an interpretation under which all axioms in the theory are true. This is what consistent meant in traditional Aristotelian logic, although in contemporary mathematical logic the term satisfiable is used instead.

In a sound formal system, every satisfiable theory is consistent, but the converse does not hold. If there exists a deductive system for which these semantic and syntactic definitions are equivalent for any theory formulated in a particular deductive logic, the logic is called complete. The completeness of the propositional calculus was proved by Paul Bernays in 1918 and Emil Post in 1921, while the completeness of (first order) predicate calculus was proved by Kurt Gödel in 1930, and consistency proofs for arithmetics restricted with respect to the induction axiom schema were proved by Ackermann (1924), von Neumann (1927) and Herbrand (1931). Stronger logics, such as second-order logic, are not complete.

A fallacy is the use of invalid or otherwise faulty reasoning in the construction of an argument that may appear to be well-reasoned if unnoticed. The term was introduced in the Western intellectual tradition by the Aristotelian De Sophisticis Elenchis.

Fallacies may be committed intentionally to manipulate or persuade by deception, unintentionally because of human limitations such as carelessness, cognitive or social biases and ignorance, or potentially due to the limitations of language and understanding of language. These delineations include not only the ignorance of the right reasoning standard but also the ignorance of relevant properties of the context. For instance, the soundness of legal arguments depends on the context in which they are made.

Metalogic is the metatheory of logic. Whereas logic studies how logical systems can be used to construct valid and sound arguments, metalogic studies the properties of logical systems. Logic concerns the truths that may be derived using a logical system; metalogic concerns the truths that may be derived about the languages and systems that are used to express truths.

The basic objects of metalogical study are formal languages, formal systems, and their interpretations. The study of interpretation of formal systems is the branch of mathematical logic that is known as model theory, and the study of deductive systems is the branch that is known as proof theory.

In mathematics, a Heyting algebra (also known as pseudo-Boolean algebra) is a bounded lattice (with join and meet operations written ∨ and ∧ and with least element 0 and greatest element 1) equipped with a binary operation a → b called implication such that (c ∧ a) ≤ b is equivalent to c ≤ (a → b). In a Heyting algebra a ≤ b can be found to be equivalent to 1 ≤ a → b; i.e. if a ≤ b then a proves b. From a logical standpoint, A → B is by this definition the weakest proposition for which modus ponens, the inference rule A → B, A ⊢ B, is sound. Like Boolean algebras, Heyting algebras form a variety axiomatizable with finitely many equations. Heyting algebras were introduced in 1930 by Arend Heyting to formalize intuitionistic logic.

Heyting algebras are distributive lattices. Every Boolean algebra is a Heyting algebra when a → b is defined as ¬a ∨ b, as is every complete distributive lattice satisfying a one-sided infinite distributive law when a → b is taken to be the supremum of the set of all c for which c ∧ a ≤ b. In the finite case, every nonempty distributive lattice, in particular every nonempty finite chain, is automatically complete and completely distributive, and hence a Heyting algebra.

In proof complexity, a Frege system is a propositional proof system whose proofs are sequences of formulas derived using a finite set of sound and implicationally complete inference rules. Frege systems (more often known as Hilbert systems in general proof theory) are named after Gottlob Frege.

The name "Frege system" was first defined by Stephen Cook and Robert Reckhow, and was intended to capture the properties of the most common propositional proof systems.