Sequent calculus in the context of Logical proof

In logic and mathematics, a formal proof or derivation is a finite sequence of sentences (known as well-formed formulas when relating to formal language), each of which is an axiom, an assumption, or follows from the preceding sentences in the sequence, according to the rule of inference. It differs from a natural language argument in that it is rigorous, unambiguous and mechanically verifiable. If the set of assumptions is empty, then the last sentence in a formal proof is called a theorem of the formal system. The notion of theorem is generally effective, but there may be no method by which we can reliably find proof of a given sentence or determine that none exists. The concepts of Fitch-style proof, sequent calculus and natural deduction are generalizations of the concept of proof.

The theorem is a syntactic consequence of all the well-formed formulas preceding it in the proof. For a well-formed formula to qualify as part of a proof, it must be the result of applying a rule of the deductive apparatus (of some formal system) to the previous well-formed formulas in the proof sequence.

Gerhard Karl Erich Gentzen (24 November 1909 – 4 August 1945) was a German mathematician and logician. He made major contributions to the foundations of mathematics, proof theory, especially on natural deduction and sequent calculus. He died of starvation in a Czech prison camp in Prague in 1945.

In mathematical logic, a judgment (or judgement) or assertion is a statement or enunciation in a metalanguage. For example, typical judgments in first-order logic would be that a string is a well-formed formula, or that a proposition is true. Similarly, a judgment may assert the occurrence of a free variable in an expression of the object language, or the provability of a proposition. In general, a judgment may be any inductively definable assertion in the metatheory.

Judgments are used in formalizing deduction systems: a logical axiom expresses a judgment, premises of a rule of inference are formed as a sequence of judgments, and their conclusion is a judgment as well (thus, hypotheses and conclusions of proofs are judgments). A characteristic feature of the variants of Hilbert-style deduction systems is that the context is not changed in any of their rules of inference, while both natural deduction and sequent calculus contain some context-changing rules. Thus, if we are interested only in the derivability of tautologies, not hypothetical judgments, then we can formalize the Hilbert-style deduction system in such a way that its rules of inference contain only judgments of a rather simple form. The same cannot be done with the other two deductions systems: as context is changed in some of their rules of inferences, they cannot be formalized so that hypothetical judgments could be avoided—not even if we want to use them just for proving derivability of tautologies.

In mathematical logic, a sequent is a very general kind of conditional assertion.

A sequent may have any number m of condition formulas A_i (called "antecedents") and any number n of asserted formulas B_j (called "succedents" or "consequents"). A sequent is understood to mean that if all of the antecedent conditions are true, then at least one of the consequent formulas is true. This style of conditional assertion is almost always associated with the conceptual framework of sequent calculus.

Linear logic is a substructural logic proposed by French logician Jean-Yves Girard as a refinement of classical and intuitionistic logic, joining the dualities of the former with many of the constructive properties of the latter. Although the logic has also been studied for its own sake, more broadly, ideas from linear logic have been influential in fields such as programming languages, game semantics, and quantum physics (because linear logic can be seen as the logic of quantum information theory), as well as linguistics, particularly because of its emphasis on resource-boundedness, duality, and interaction.

Linear logic lends itself to many different presentations, explanations, and intuitions.Proof-theoretically, it derives from an analysis of classical sequent calculus in which uses of (the structural rules) contraction and weakening are carefully controlled. Operationally, this means that logical deduction is no longer merely about an ever-expanding collection of persistent "truths", but also a way of manipulating resources that cannot always be duplicated or thrown away at will. In terms of simple denotational models, linear logic may be seen as refining the interpretation of intuitionistic logic by replacing cartesian (closed) categories by symmetric monoidal (closed) categories, or the interpretation of classical logic by replacing Boolean algebras by C*-algebras.