Kurt Gödel in the context of Bertrand Russell

A formal system (or deductive system) is an abstract structure and formalization of an axiomatic system used for deducing, using rules of inference, theorems from axioms.

In 1921, David Hilbert proposed to use formal systems as the foundation of knowledge in mathematics.However, in 1931 Kurt Gödel proved that any consistent formal system sufficiently powerful to express basic arithmetic cannot prove its own completeness. This effectively showed that Hilbert's program was impossible as stated.

Mathematical logic is the study of formal logic within mathematics. Major subareas include model theory, proof theory, set theory, and recursion theory (also known as computability theory). Research in mathematical logic commonly addresses the mathematical properties of formal systems of logic such as their expressive or deductive power. However, it can also include uses of logic to characterize correct mathematical reasoning or to establish foundations of mathematics.

Since its inception, mathematical logic has both contributed to and been motivated by the study of foundations of mathematics. This study began in the late 19th century with the development of axiomatic frameworks for geometry, arithmetic, and analysis. In the early 20th century it was shaped by David Hilbert's program to prove the consistency of foundational theories. Results of Kurt Gödel, Gerhard Gentzen, and others provided partial resolution to the program, and clarified the issues involved in proving consistency. Work in set theory showed that almost all ordinary mathematics can be formalized in terms of sets, although there are some theorems that cannot be proven in common axiom systems for set theory. Contemporary work in the foundations of mathematics often focuses on establishing which parts of mathematics can be formalized in particular formal systems (as in reverse mathematics) rather than trying to find theories in which all of mathematics can be developed.

In deductive logic, a consistent theory is one that does not lead to a logical contradiction. A theory ${\displaystyle T}$ is consistent if there is no formula ${\displaystyle \varphi }$ such that both ${\displaystyle \varphi }$ and its negation ${\displaystyle \lnot \varphi }$ are elements of the set of consequences of ${\displaystyle T}$. Let ${\displaystyle A}$ be a set of closed sentences (informally "axioms") and ${\displaystyle \langle A\rangle }$ the set of closed sentences provable from ${\displaystyle A}$ under some (specified, possibly implicitly) formal deductive system. The set of axioms ${\displaystyle A}$ is consistent when there is no formula ${\displaystyle \varphi }$ such that ${\displaystyle \varphi \in \langle A\rangle }$ and ${\displaystyle \lnot \varphi \in \langle A\rangle }$. A trivial theory (i.e., one which proves every sentence in the language of the theory) is clearly inconsistent. Conversely, in an explosive formal system (e.g., classical or intuitionistic propositional or first-order logics) every inconsistent theory is trivial. Consistency of a theory is a syntactic notion, whose semantic counterpart is satisfiability. A theory is satisfiable if it has a model, i.e., there exists an interpretation under which all axioms in the theory are true. This is what consistent meant in traditional Aristotelian logic, although in contemporary mathematical logic the term satisfiable is used instead.

In a sound formal system, every satisfiable theory is consistent, but the converse does not hold. If there exists a deductive system for which these semantic and syntactic definitions are equivalent for any theory formulated in a particular deductive logic, the logic is called complete. The completeness of the propositional calculus was proved by Paul Bernays in 1918 and Emil Post in 1921, while the completeness of (first order) predicate calculus was proved by Kurt Gödel in 1930, and consistency proofs for arithmetics restricted with respect to the induction axiom schema were proved by Ackermann (1924), von Neumann (1927) and Herbrand (1931). Stronger logics, such as second-order logic, are not complete.

In philosophy and theology, metempsychosis (Ancient Greek: μετεμψύχωσις) is the transmigration of the soul, especially its reincarnation after death. The term is derived from ancient Greek philosophy, and has been recontextualized by modern philosophers such as Arthur Schopenhauer, Kurt Gödel, Mircea Eliade, and Magdalena Villaba; otherwise, the word "transmigration" is more appropriate. The word plays a prominent role in James Joyce's Ulysses and is also associated with Nietzsche. Another term sometimes used synonymously is palingenesis.

In set theory, the axiom of limitation of size was proposed by John von Neumann in his 1925 axiom system for sets and classes. It formalizes the limitation of size principle, which avoids the paradoxes encountered in earlier formulations of set theory by recognizing that some classes are too big to be sets. Von Neumann realized that the paradoxes are caused by permitting these big classes to be members of a class. A class that is a member of a class is a set; a class that is not a set is a proper class. Every class is a subclass of V, the class of all sets. The axiom of limitation of size says that a class is a set if and only if it is smaller than V—that is, there is no function mapping it onto V. Usually, this axiom is stated in the equivalent form: A class is a proper class if and only if there is a function that maps it onto V.

Von Neumann's axiom implies the axioms of replacement, separation, union, and global choice. It is equivalent to the combination of replacement, union, and global choice in Von Neumann–Bernays–Gödel set theory (NBG) and Morse–Kelley set theory. Later expositions of class theories—such as those of Paul Bernays, Kurt Gödel, and John L. Kelley—use replacement, union, and a choice axiom equivalent to global choice rather than von Neumann's axiom. In 1930, Ernst Zermelo defined models of set theory satisfying the axiom of limitation of size.

Sir Michael Anthony Eardley Dummett FBA (/ˈdʌmɪt/; 27 June 1925 – 27 December 2011) was an English academic described as "among the most significant British philosophers of the last century and a leading campaigner for racial tolerance and equality." He was, until 1992, Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford. He wrote on the history of analytic philosophy, notably as an interpreter of Frege, and made original contributions particularly in the philosophies of mathematics, logic, language and metaphysics.

He was known for his work on truth and meaning and their implications to debates between realism and anti-realism, a term he helped to popularize. In mathematical logic, he developed an intermediate logic, a logical system intermediate between classical logic and intuitionistic logic that had already been studied by Kurt Gödel: the Gödel–Dummett logic. In voting theory, he devised the Quota Borda system of proportional voting, based on the Borda count, and conjectured the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem together with Robin Farquharson; he also devised the condition of proportionality for solid coalitions. Besides his main work in analytic philosophy, he also wrote extensively on the history of card games, particularly on tarot card games.

The Institute for Advanced Study (IAS) is an independent center for theoretical research and intellectual inquiry located in Princeton, New Jersey. It has served as the academic home of internationally preeminent scholars, including Albert Einstein, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Emmy Noether, Hermann Weyl, John von Neumann, Michael Walzer, Clifford Geertz and Kurt Gödel, many of whom had emigrated from Europe to the United States.

It was founded in 1930 by American educator Abraham Flexner, together with philanthropists Louis Bamberger and Caroline Bamberger Fuld. Despite collaborative ties and neighboring geographic location, the institute, being independent, has "no formal links" with Princeton University. The institute does not charge tuition or fees.

Gödel's incompleteness theorems are two theorems of mathematical logic that are concerned with the limits of provability in formal axiomatic theories. These results, published by Kurt Gödel in 1931, are important both in mathematical logic and in the philosophy of mathematics. The theorems are interpreted as showing that Hilbert's program to find a complete and consistent set of axioms for all mathematics is impossible.

The first incompleteness theorem states that no consistent system of axioms whose theorems can be listed by an effective procedure (i.e. an algorithm) is capable of proving all truths about the arithmetic of natural numbers. For any such consistent formal system, there will always be statements about natural numbers that are true, but that are unprovable within the system. Equivalently, there will always be statements about natural numbers that are false, but that are unprovably false within the system.

In mathematical logic, a Gödel numbering is a function that assigns to each symbol and well-formed formula of some formal language a unique natural number, called its Gödel number. Kurt Gödel developed the concept for the proof of his incompleteness theorems.

A Gödel numbering can be interpreted as an encoding in which a number is assigned to each symbol of a mathematical notation, after which a sequence of natural numbers can then represent a sequence of symbols. These sequences of natural numbers can again be represented by single natural numbers, facilitating their manipulation in formal theories of arithmetic.

In computability theory, the Church–Turing thesis (also known as computability thesis, the Turing–Church thesis, the Church–Turing conjecture, Church's thesis, Church's conjecture, and Turing's thesis) is a thesis about the nature of computable functions. It states that a function on the natural numbers can be calculated by an effective method if and only if it is computable by a Turing machine. The thesis is named after American mathematician Alonzo Church and the British mathematician Alan Turing. Before the precise definition of computable function, mathematicians often used the informal term effectively calculable to describe functions that are computable by paper-and-pencil methods. In the 1930s, several independent attempts were made to formalize the notion of computability:

• In 1933, Kurt Gödel, with Jacques Herbrand, formalized the definition of the class of general recursive functions: the smallest class of functions (with arbitrarily many arguments) that is closed under composition, recursion, and minimization, and includes zero, successor, and all projections.
• In 1936, Alonzo Church created a method for defining functions called the λ-calculus. Within λ-calculus, he defined an encoding of the natural numbers called the Church numerals. A function on the natural numbers is called λ-computable if the corresponding function on the Church numerals can be represented by a term of the λ-calculus.
• Also in 1936, before learning of Church's work, Alan Turing created a theoretical model for machines, now called Turing machines, that could carry out calculations from inputs by manipulating symbols on a tape. Given a suitable encoding of the natural numbers as sequences of symbols, a function on the natural numbers is called Turing computable if some Turing machine computes the corresponding function on encoded natural numbers.

Church, Kleene, and Turing proved that these three formally defined classes of computable functions coincide: a function is λ-computable if and only if it is Turing computable, and if and only if it is general recursive. This has led mathematicians and computer scientists to believe that the concept of computability is accurately characterized by these three equivalent processes. Other formal attempts to characterize computability have subsequently strengthened this belief (see below).

The Gödel Prize is an annual prize for outstanding papers in the area of theoretical computer science, given jointly by the European Association for Theoretical Computer Science (EATCS) and the Association for Computing Machinery Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computational Theory (ACM SIGACT). The award is named in honor of Kurt Gödel. Gödel's connection to theoretical computer science is that he was the first to mention the "P versus NP" question, in a 1956 letter to John von Neumann in which Gödel asked whether a certain NP-complete problem could be solved in quadratic or linear time.

The Gödel Prize has been awarded since 1993. The prize is awarded alternately at ICALP (even years) and STOC (odd years). STOC is the ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, one of the main North American conferences in theoretical computer science, whereas ICALP is the International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, one of the main European conferences in the field. To be eligible for the prize, a paper must be published in a refereed journal within the last 14 (formerly 7) years. The prize includes a reward of US$5000.

The Quine–Putnam indispensability argument is an argument in the philosophy of mathematics for the existence of abstract mathematical objects such as numbers and sets, a position known as mathematical platonism. It was named after the philosophers Willard Van Orman Quine and Hilary Putnam, and is one of the most important arguments in the philosophy of mathematics.

Although elements of the indispensability argument may have originated with thinkers such as Gottlob Frege and Kurt Gödel, Quine's development of the argument was unique for introducing to it a number of his philosophical positions such as naturalism, confirmational holism, and the criterion of ontological commitment. Putnam gave Quine's argument its first detailed formulation in his 1971 book Philosophy of Logic. He later came to disagree with various aspects of Quine's thinking, however, and formulated his own indispensability argument based on the no miracles argument in the philosophy of science. A standard form of the argument in contemporary philosophy is credited to Mark Colyvan; whilst being influenced by both Quine and Putnam, it differs in important ways from their formulations. It is presented in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: