Kripke semantics in the context of "Modal logic"

⭐ In the context of modal logic, Kripke semantics is primarily concerned with determining the truth of statements based on their relationship to…

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⭐ Core Definition: Kripke semantics

Kripke semantics (also known as relational semantics or frame semantics, and often confused with possible world semantics) is a formal semantics for non-classical logic systems created in the late 1950s and early 1960s by Saul Kripke and André Joyal. It was first conceived for modal logics, and later adapted to intuitionistic logic and other non-classical systems. The development of Kripke semantics was a breakthrough in the theory of non-classical logics, because the model theory of such logics was almost non-existent before Kripke (algebraic semantics existed, but were considered 'syntax in disguise').

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👉 Kripke semantics in the context of Modal logic

Modal logic is a kind of logic used to represent statements about necessity and possibility. In philosophy and related fieldsit is used as a tool for understanding concepts such as knowledge, obligation, and causation. For instance, in epistemic modal logic, the formula can be used to represent the statement that is known. In deontic modal logic, that same formula can represent that is a moral obligation. Modal logic considers the inferences that modal statements give rise to. For instance, most epistemic modal logics treat the formula as a tautology, representing the principle that only true statements can count as knowledge. However, this formula is not a tautology in deontic modal logic, since what ought to be true can be false.

Modal logics are formal systems that include unary operators such as and , representing possibility and necessity respectively. For instance the modal formula can be read as "possibly " while can be read as "necessarily ". In the standard relational semantics for modal logic, formulas are assigned truth values relative to a possible world. A formula's truth value at one possible world can depend on the truth values of other formulas at other accessible possible worlds. In particular, is true at a world if is true at some accessible possible world, while is true at a world if is true at every accessible possible world. A variety of proof systems exist which are sound and complete with respect to the semantics one gets by restricting the accessibility relation. For instance, the deontic modal logic D is sound and complete if one requires the accessibility relation to be serial.

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Kripke semantics in the context of Saul Kripke

Saul Aaron Kripke (/ˈkrɪpki/; November 13, 1940 – September 15, 2022) was an American analytic philosopher and logician. He was Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York and emeritus professor at Princeton University. From the 1960s until his death, he was a central figure in a number of fields related to mathematical and modal logic, philosophy of language and mathematics, metaphysics, epistemology, and recursion theory.

Kripke made influential and original contributions to logic, especially modal logic. His principal contribution is a semantics for modal logic involving possible worlds, now called Kripke semantics. He received the 2001 Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy.

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Kripke semantics in the context of Accessibility relation

An accessibility relation is a relation which plays a key role in assigning truth values to sentences in the relational semantics for modal logic. In relational semantics, a modal formula's truth value at a possible world can depend on what is true at another possible world , but only if the accessibility relation relates to . For instance, if holds at some world such that , the formula will be true at . The fact is crucial. If did not relate to , then would be false at unless also held at some other world such that .

Accessibility relations are motivated conceptually by the fact that natural language modal statements depend on some, but not all, alternative scenarios. For instance, the sentence "It might be raining" is not generally judged true simply because one can imagine a scenario where it is raining. Rather, its truth depends on whether such a scenario is ruled out by available information. This fact can be formalized in modal logic by choosing an accessibility relation such that if is compatible with the information that is available to the speaker in .

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