Jihadism in the context of "Afghan Arabs"

Play Trivia Questions online!

or

Skip to study material about Jihadism in the context of "Afghan Arabs"

Ad spacer

⭐ Core Definition: Jihadism

Jihadism is a neologism for modern, armed militant Islamic movements that seek to establish states based on Islamic principles. In a narrower sense, it refers to the belief that armed confrontation is an efficient and theologically legitimate method of socio-political change towards an Islamic system of governance. The term "jihadism" has been applied to various Islamic extremist or Islamist individuals and organizations with militant ideologies based on the classical Islamic notion of lesser jihad.

Jihadism has its roots in the late 19th- and early 20th-century ideological developments of Islamic revivalism, which further developed into Qutbism and Salafi jihadism related ideologies during the 20th and 21st centuries. Jihadist ideologues envision jihad as a "revolutionary struggle" against the international order to unite the Muslim world under Islamic law.

↓ Menu

>>>PUT SHARE BUTTONS HERE<<<

👉 Jihadism in the context of Afghan Arabs

Afghan Arabs (Arabic: أفغان عرب; Pashto: افغان عربان; Dari: عرب‌های افغان) were the Arab Muslims who immigrated to Afghanistan and joined the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet–Afghan War. The term does not refer to the Central Asian Arabs of Afghanistan who are an ethnic Arab minority group living in the north western parts of the country. Despite being referred to as Afghans, they originated from the Arab world and did not hold Afghan citizenship.

It is estimated that between 8,000 and 35,000 Arabs immigrated to Afghanistan to partake in what much of the Muslim world was calling an Islamic holy war against the Soviet Union, which had militarily intervened in Afghanistan to support the ruling People's Democratic Party against the rebelling jihadists. The Saudi Arabian journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who was the first Arab journalist from a major Arabic-language media organization to cover the Soviet–Afghan War, approximated that there were 10,000 Arab volunteer fighters in Afghanistan during the conflict. Among many Muslims, the Afghan Arabs achieved near hero-status for their association with the defeat of the Soviet Union in 1989, and it was with this prestige that they were later able to exert considerable influence in mounting jihadist struggles in other countries, including their own. Their name notwithstanding, none of them were Afghans, and some who were grouped with the community were not even Arabs. A number of the foreign jihadists in Afghanistan were Turkic or Malay, among other ethnicities, or non-Arabs from Arab countries, such as Kurds.

↓ Explore More Topics
In this Dossier

Jihadism in the context of Egypt–Israel barrier

The Egypt–Israel barrier or Egypt–Israel border fence (Hebrew: שְׁעוֹן הַחוֹל, romanizedSheʽon HaḤol, lit.'sand clock') refers to a separation barrier built by Israel along its border with Egypt. Initial construction on the barrier began on 22 November 2010, and its original purpose as a common fence was to curb the large influx of illegal migrants from African countries into Israel. However, in the wake of the Egyptian Crisis after the 2011 Revolution, Israel's southwestern border with Egypt experienced an increase in militant jihadist activity with the outbreak of the Sinai insurgency. In response, Israel upgraded the steel barrier—called Project Hourglass by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)—to include cameras, radars, and motion detectors. In January 2013, construction on the barrier's main section was completed; the final section was completed in December 2013.

A number of countries, including the United States and India, have sent delegations to Israel to observe its border-controlling capabilities and the various technologies used by the IDF to secure Israel's boundaries against the Arab states. Some of these countries have expressed an interest in implementing Israeli strategies and technologies with their own border fences; the Trump administration cited Israel's border strategies as inspiration for the barrier built by the United States along its border with Mexico, while Indian officials have discussed the implementation of an "Israel-type model" for the barrier built by India along its border with Pakistan.

↑ Return to Menu

Jihadism in the context of Ahmed al-Sharaa

Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa (born 29 October 1982), also known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani, is a Syrian politician, revolutionary, and former rebel commander who has served as the president of Syria since 2025. He previously served as the emir of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) from 2017 to 2025 and was Syria's de facto leader from December 2024 until his appointment as president.

Born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to a Syrian Sunni Muslim family from Daraa and the Golan Heights, he grew up in Syria's capital, Damascus. Al-Sharaa joined al-Qaeda in Iraq shortly before the 2003 invasion of Iraq and fought for three years in the Iraqi insurgency. American forces captured and imprisoned him from 2006 to 2011. His release coincided with the Syrian Revolution against the Ba'athist dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad. Al-Sharaa created the al-Nusra Front in 2012 with the support of al-Qaeda to topple the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war. As emir of the al-Nusra Front, al-Sharaa built a stronghold in the northwestern Idlib Governorate. He resisted Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's attempts to merge al-Nusra Front with the Islamic State, leading to armed conflict between the two groups. In 2016, al-Sharaa cut al-Nusra's ties with al-Qaeda and launched a crackdown on its loyalists. Since breaking with al-Qaeda, he has sought international legitimacy by presenting a more moderate view of himself, renouncing transnational jihadism against Western nations, and focusing on governance in Syria while vowing to protect Syria's minorities.

↑ Return to Menu

Jihadism in the context of Hijackers in the September 11 attacks

The aircraft hijackers in the September 11 attacks were 19 men affiliated with al-Qaeda, a jihadist organization based in Afghanistan. They hailed from four countries; 15 of them were citizens of Saudi Arabia, two were from the United Arab Emirates, one was from Egypt, and one from Lebanon. To carry out the attacks, the hijackers were organized into four teams each led by a pilot-trained hijacker who would commandeer the flight with three or four "muscle hijackers" who were trained to help subdue the pilots, passengers, and crew. Each team was assigned to a different flight and given a unique target to crash their respective planes into. Mohamed Atta was the assigned ringleader over all four groups.

The first hijackers to arrive in the United States were Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, who settled in San Diego County, California, in January 2000. They were followed by three hijacker-pilots, Hamburg cell members Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah in mid-2000 to undertake flight training at Huffman Aviation flight-training school in Venice, Florida. The fourth hijacker-pilot, Hani Hanjour, who was not a member of the Hamburg cell, arrived in San Diego in December 2000. The rest of the "muscle hijackers" arrived in early- and mid-2001.

↑ Return to Menu

Jihadism in the context of Islamic extremism

Islamic extremism is characterised by extremist beliefs, behaviors and ideologies adhered to by some Muslims within Islam. The term 'Islamic extremism' is contentious, encompassing a spectrum of definitions, ranging from academic interpretations of Islamic supremacy to the notion that all ideologies other than Islam have failed and are inferior.

Islamic extremism is different from Islamic fundamentalism or Islamism. Islamic fundamentalism refers to a movement among Muslims advocating a return to the fundamental principles of an Islamic state in Muslim-majority countries. Meanwhile, Islamism constitutes a form of political Islam. However, both Islamic fundamentalism and Islamism can also be classified as subsets of Islamic extremism. Acts of violence committed by Islamic terrorists and jihadists are often associated with these extremist beliefs.

↑ Return to Menu

Jihadism in the context of Qutbism

Qutbism is an exonym that refers to the Sunni Islamist beliefs and ideology of Sayyid Qutb, a leading Islamist revolutionary of the Muslim Brotherhood who was executed by the Egyptian government of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1966. Influenced by the doctrines of earlier Islamists like Hasan al-Banna and Maududi, Qutbism advocates Islamic extremist violence in order to establish an Islamic government, in addition to promoting offensive Jihad. Qutbism has been characterized as an Islamofascist and Islamic terrorist ideology.

Sayyid Qutb's treatises deeply influenced numerous jihadist ideologues and organizations across the Muslim world. Qutbism has gained prominence due to its influence on notable Jihadist figures of contemporary era such as Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Saif al-Adel. Its ideas have also been adopted by the Salafi-jihadist terrorist organization Islamic State (ISIL). It was one inspiration that influenced Ruhollah Khomeini in the development of his own ideology, Khomeinism.

↑ Return to Menu

Jihadism in the context of Ansar Bait al-Maqdis

Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (ABM; Arabic: أنصار بيت المقدس, romanizedAnṣār Bayt al-Maqdis, lit.'Supporters of the Holy House'), or Ansar Al-Quds (lit.'Supporters of Jerusalem'), was an Islamist jihadist, extremist militant group operating in the Sinai Peninsula from 2011 to 2014.

Ansar Bait al-Maqdis was linked with al-Qaeda. It operated in Sinai, focusing its efforts on Egypt and the gas pipeline to Jordan, with a handful attacks directed at Israel. In mid-2013, it began a campaign of attacks on Egyptian security forces, and in November 2014 pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). Most of the group became a branch of IS, renaming itself Islamic State - Sinai Province.

↑ Return to Menu

Jihadism in the context of Anti-Western sentiment

Anti-Western sentiment, also known as anti-Atlanticism or Westernophobia, refers to broad opposition, bias, or hostility towards the people, culture, or policies of the Western world.

This sentiment is found worldwide. It often stems from anti-imperialism and criticism of past colonial actions by Western powers. For example, in Africa, figures like Patrice Lumumba and Mobutu Sese Seko blamed the West for imperialism in the Congo region. In Ethiopia, resentment over internal politics and conflict resolution during the Tigray war led to anti-Western sentiment. In the Middle East, Pan-Arabism and Islamism contribute to anti-Western attitudes. Jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS view Western countries as targets for terrorism due to perceived insults against Islam and military interventions in Muslim countries. Many Latin American countries harbor criticism due to historical American and European interventions. In Russia, anti-Western sentiment has been endorsed by many. Russian leaders have traditionally rejected Western liberalism which they see as a threat to Russian hegemony in the region.

↑ Return to Menu

Jihadism in the context of Insurgency in Cabo Delgado

The insurgency in Cabo Delgado is an ongoing Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique, mainly fought between militant Islamists and jihadists attempting to establish an Islamic state in the region, and Mozambican security forces. Civilians have been the main targets of terrorist attacks by Islamist militants. The main insurgent faction is Ansar al-Sunna, a native extremist faction with tenuous international connections. From mid-2018, the Islamic State's Central Africa Province has allegedly become active in northern Mozambique as well, and claimed its first attack against Mozambican security forces in June 2019. In addition, bandits have exploited the rebellion to carry out raids. As of 2020, the insurgency intensified, as in the first half of 2020 there were nearly as many attacks carried out as in the whole of 2019.

Ansar al-Sunna (English: "Supporters of the Tradition") is similar to the name of an Iraqi Sunni insurgent group that fought against U.S. troops between 2003 and 2007. They are known locally as al-Shabaab but they are not formally related to the better known Somali al-Shabaab. Some of the militants are known to speak Portuguese, the official language of Mozambique, however others speak Kimwane, the local language, and Swahili, the lingua franca language spoken north of that area in the Great Lakes region. Reports also state that members are allegedly mostly Mozambicans from Mocimboa da Praia, Palma, and Macomia districts, but also include foreign nationals from Tanzania and Somalia.

↑ Return to Menu