Intuitionistic logic in the context of "Inference rules"

In analytic philosophy, anti-realism is the position that the truth of a statement rests on its demonstrability through internal logic mechanisms, such as the context principle or intuitionistic logic, in direct opposition to the realist notion that the truth of a statement rests on its correspondence to an external, independent reality. In anti-realism, this external reality is hypothetical and is not assumed.

There are many varieties of anti-realism, such as metaphysical, mathematical, semantic, scientific, moral and epistemic. The term was first articulated by British philosopher Michael Dummett in an argument against a form of realism Dummett saw as 'colorless reductionism'.

In logic, negation, also called the logical not or logical complement, is an operation that takes a proposition ${\displaystyle P}$ to another proposition "not ${\displaystyle P}$", written ${\displaystyle \neg P}$, ${\displaystyle {\mathord {\sim }}P}$, ${\displaystyle P^{\prime }}$ or ${\displaystyle {\overline {P}}}$. It is interpreted intuitively as being true when ${\displaystyle P}$ is false, and false when ${\displaystyle P}$ is true. For example, if ${\displaystyle P}$ is "The dog runs", then "not ${\displaystyle P}$" is "The dog does not run". An operand of a negation is called a negand or negatum.

Negation is a unary logical connective. It may furthermore be applied not only to propositions, but also to notions, truth values, or semantic values more generally. In classical logic, negation is normally identified with the truth function that takes truth to falsity (and vice versa). In intuitionistic logic, according to the Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov interpretation, the negation of a proposition ${\displaystyle P}$ is the proposition whose proofs are the refutations of ${\displaystyle P}$.

Kripke semantics (also known as relational semantics or frame semantics, and often confused with possible world semantics) is a formal semantics for non-classical logic systems created in the late 1950s and early 1960s by Saul Kripke and André Joyal. It was first conceived for modal logics, and later adapted to intuitionistic logic and other non-classical systems. The development of Kripke semantics was a breakthrough in the theory of non-classical logics, because the model theory of such logics was almost non-existent before Kripke (algebraic semantics existed, but were considered 'syntax in disguise').

In mathematics, a Heyting algebra (also known as pseudo-Boolean algebra) is a bounded lattice (with join and meet operations written ∨ and ∧ and with least element 0 and greatest element 1) equipped with a binary operation a → b called implication such that (c ∧ a) ≤ b is equivalent to c ≤ (a → b). In a Heyting algebra a ≤ b can be found to be equivalent to 1 ≤ a → b; i.e. if a ≤ b then a proves b. From a logical standpoint, A → B is by this definition the weakest proposition for which modus ponens, the inference rule A → B, A ⊢ B, is sound. Like Boolean algebras, Heyting algebras form a variety axiomatizable with finitely many equations. Heyting algebras were introduced in 1930 by Arend Heyting to formalize intuitionistic logic.

Heyting algebras are distributive lattices. Every Boolean algebra is a Heyting algebra when a → b is defined as ¬a ∨ b, as is every complete distributive lattice satisfying a one-sided infinite distributive law when a → b is taken to be the supremum of the set of all c for which c ∧ a ≤ b. In the finite case, every nonempty distributive lattice, in particular every nonempty finite chain, is automatically complete and completely distributive, and hence a Heyting algebra.

In propositional logic, the double negation of a statement states that "it is not the case that the statement is not true". In classical logic, every statement is logically equivalent to its double negation, but this is not true in intuitionistic logic; this can be expressed by the formula A ≡ ~(~A) where the sign ≡ expresses logical equivalence and the sign ~ expresses negation.

Like the law of the excluded middle, this principle is considered to be a law of thought in classical logic, but it is disallowed by intuitionistic logic. The principle was stated as a theorem of propositional logic by Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica as:

In classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and similar logical systems, the principle of explosion is the law according to which any statement can be proven from a contradiction. That is, from a contradiction, any proposition (including its negation) can be inferred; this is known as deductive explosion.

The proof of this principle was first given by 12th-century French philosopher William of Soissons. Due to the principle of explosion, the existence of a contradiction (inconsistency) in a formal axiomatic system is disastrous; since any statement—true or not—can be proven, it trivializes the concepts of truth and falsity. Around the turn of the 20th century, the discovery of contradictions such as Russell's paradox at the foundations of mathematics thus threatened the entire structure of mathematics. Mathematicians such as Gottlob Frege, Ernst Zermelo, Abraham Fraenkel, and Thoralf Skolem put much effort into revising set theory to eliminate these contradictions, resulting in the modern Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory.

Sir Michael Anthony Eardley Dummett FBA (/ˈdʌmɪt/; 27 June 1925 – 27 December 2011) was an English academic described as "among the most significant British philosophers of the last century and a leading campaigner for racial tolerance and equality." He was, until 1992, Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford. He wrote on the history of analytic philosophy, notably as an interpreter of Frege, and made original contributions particularly in the philosophies of mathematics, logic, language and metaphysics.

He was known for his work on truth and meaning and their implications to debates between realism and anti-realism, a term he helped to popularize. In mathematical logic, he developed an intermediate logic, a logical system intermediate between classical logic and intuitionistic logic that had already been studied by Kurt Gödel: the Gödel–Dummett logic. In voting theory, he devised the Quota Borda system of proportional voting, based on the Borda count, and conjectured the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem together with Robin Farquharson; he also devised the condition of proportionality for solid coalitions. Besides his main work in analytic philosophy, he also wrote extensively on the history of card games, particularly on tarot card games.