Law of excluded middle in the context of "Intuitionistic logic"

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⭐ Core Definition: Law of excluded middle

In logic, the law of excluded middle or the principle of excluded middle states that for every proposition, either this proposition or its negation is true. Symbolically expressed, the law is (p ∨ ~p).

The law of the excluded middle is also known as the law/principle of the excluded third, in Latin principium tertii exclusi. Another Latin designation for the law is tertium non datur or "no third [possibility] is given".

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Law of excluded middle in the context of Philosophical logic

Understood in a narrow sense, philosophical logic is the area of logic that studies the application of logical methods to philosophical problems, often in the form of extended logical systems like modal logic. Some theorists conceive philosophical logic in a wider sense as the study of the scope and nature of logic in general. In this sense, philosophical logic can be seen as identical to the philosophy of logic, which includes additional topics like how to define logic or a discussion of the fundamental concepts of logic. The current article treats philosophical logic in the narrow sense, in which it forms one field of inquiry within the philosophy of logic.

An important issue for philosophical logic is the question of how to classify the great variety of non-classical logical systems, many of which are of rather recent origin. One form of classification often found in the literature is to distinguish between extended logics and deviant logics. Logic itself can be defined as the study of valid inference. Classical logic is the dominant form of logic and articulates rules of inference in accordance with logical intuitions shared by many, like the law of excluded middle, the double negation elimination, and the bivalence of truth.

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Law of excluded middle in the context of Intuitionistic propositional calculus

Intuitionistic logic, sometimes more generally called constructive logic, refers to systems of symbolic logic that differ from the systems used for classical logic by more closely mirroring the notion of constructive proof. In particular, systems of intuitionistic logic do not assume the law of excluded middle and double negation elimination, which are fundamental inference rules in classical logic.

Formalized intuitionistic logic was originally developed by Arend Heyting to provide a formal basis for L. E. J. Brouwer's programme of intuitionism. From a proof-theoretic perspective, Heyting’s calculus is a restriction of classical logic in which the law of excluded middle and double negation elimination have been removed. Excluded middle and double negation elimination can still be proved for some propositions on a case by case basis, however, but do not hold universally as they do with classical logic. The standard explanation of intuitionistic logic is the BHK interpretation.

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Law of excluded middle in the context of Second-order logic

In logic and mathematics, second-order logic is an extension of first-order logic, which itself is an extension of propositional logic. Second-order logic is in turn extended by higher-order logic and type theory.

First-order logic quantifies only variables that range over individuals (elements of the domain of discourse); second-order logic, in addition, quantifies over relations. For example, the second-order sentence says that for every formula P, and every individual x, either Px is true or not(Px) is true (this is the law of excluded middle). Second-order logic also includes quantification over sets, functions, and other variables (see section below). Both first-order and second-order logic use the idea of a domain of discourse (often called simply the "domain" or the "universe"). The domain is a set over which individual elements may be quantified.
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Law of excluded middle in the context of Definite descriptions

In formal semantics and philosophy of language, a definite description is a denoting phrase in the form of "the X" where X is a noun-phrase or a singular common noun. The definite description is proper if X applies to a unique individual or object. For example: "the first person in space" and "the 42nd President of the United States of America" are proper. The definite descriptions "the person in space" and "the Senator from Ohio" are improper because the noun phrase X applies to more than one thing, and the definite descriptions "the first man on Mars" and "the Senator from Washington D.C." are improper because X applies to nothing. Improper descriptions raise some difficult questions about the law of excluded middle, denotation, modality, and mental content.

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Law of excluded middle in the context of Principle of bivalence

In logic, the semantic principle (or law) of bivalence states that every declarative sentence expressing a proposition (of a theory under inspection) has exactly one truth value, either true or false. A logic satisfying this principle is called a two-valued logic or bivalent logic.

In formal logic, the principle of bivalence becomes a property that a semantics may or may not possess. It is not the same as the law of excluded middle, however, and a semantics may satisfy that law without being bivalent.

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Law of excluded middle in the context of Laws of thought

The laws of thought are an obsolete way to refer to three logical principles: the law of identity (LOI), the law of non-contradiction (LNC), and the law of excluded middle (LEM).

In modern logic these are simply some of the class of tautologies, and are not inference rules. There is no system of logic which uses the three "laws" as axioms, and the interpretations of even just the three "laws" varies widely.

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Law of excluded middle in the context of Jan Łukasiewicz

Jan Łukasiewicz (Polish: [ˈjan wukaˈɕɛvit͡ʂ] ; 21 December 1878 – 13 February 1956) was a Polish logician and philosopher who is best known for Polish notation and Łukasiewicz logic. His work centred on philosophical logic, mathematical logic and history of logic. He thought innovatively about traditional propositional logic, the principle of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle, offering one of the earliest systems of many-valued logic. Contemporary research on Aristotelian logic also builds on innovative works by Łukasiewicz, which applied methods from modern logic to the formalization of Aristotle's syllogistic.

The Łukasiewicz approach was reinvigorated in the early 1970s in a series of papers by John Corcoran and Timothy Smiley that inform modern translations of Prior Analytics by Robin Smith in 1989 and Gisela Striker in 2009. Łukasiewicz is regarded as one of the most important historians of logic.

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