In contract theory, mechanism design, and economics, an information asymmetry is a situation where one party has more or better information than the other.
Information asymmetry creates an imbalance of power in transactions, which can sometimes cause the transactions to be inefficient, causing market failure in the worst case. Examples of this problem are adverse selection, moral hazard, and monopolies of knowledge.
In economics and industrial design, planned obsolescence (also called built-in obsolescence or premature obsolescence) is the concept of policies planning or designing a product with an artificially limited useful life or a purposely frail design, so that it becomes obsolete after a certain predetermined period of time upon which it decrementally functions or suddenly ceases to function, or might be perceived as unfashionable. Once regarded as a conspiracy theory, the rationale behind this strategy is to generate long-term sales volume by reducing the time between repeat purchases (referred to as "shortening the replacement cycle"). It is the deliberate shortening of the lifespan of a product to force people to purchase functional replacements.
Planned obsolescence tends to work best when a producer has at least an oligopoly. Before introducing a planned obsolescence, the producer has to know that the customer is at least somewhat likely to buy a replacement from them in the form of brand loyalty. In these cases of planned obsolescence, there is an information asymmetry between the producer, who knows how long the product was designed to last, and the customer, who does not. When a market becomes more competitive, product lifespans tend to increase. For example, when Japanese vehicles with longer lifespans entered the American market in the 1960s and 1970s, American carmakers were forced to respond by building more durable products.
Financial regulation is a broad set of policies that apply to the financial sector in most jurisdictions, justified by two main features of finance: systemic risk, which implies that the failure of financial firms involves public interest considerations; and information asymmetry, which justifies curbs on freedom of contract in selected areas of financial services, particularly those that involve retail clients and/or principal–agent problems. An integral part of financial regulation is the supervision of designated financial firms and markets by specialized authorities such as securities commissions and bank supervisors.
In some jurisdictions, certain aspects of financial supervision are delegated to self-regulatory organizations. Financial regulation forms one of three legal categories which constitutes the content of financial law, the other two being market practices and case law.
The arm's length principle (ALP) is the condition or the fact that the parties of a transaction are independent and on an equal footing. Such a transaction is known as an "arm's-length transaction". It is used specifically in contract law to arrange an agreement that will stand up to legal scrutiny, even though the parties may have shared interests (e.g., employer-employee) or are too closely related to be seen as completely independent (e.g., the parties have familial ties).
An arm's length relationship is distinguished from a fiduciary relationship, where the parties are not on an equal footing, but rather, power and information asymmetries exist. It is also one of the key elements in international taxation as it allows an adequate allocation of profit taxation rights among countries that conclude double tax conventions, through transfer pricing, among each other. Transfer pricing and the arm's length principle were one of the focal points of the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) model developed by the OECD and endorsed by the G20.
In neoclassical economics, market failure is a situation in which the allocation of goods and services by a free market is not Pareto efficient, often leading to a net loss of economic value. The first known use of the term by economists was in 1958, but the concept has been traced back to the Victorian writers John Stuart Mill and Henry Sidgwick.Market failures are often associated with public goods, time-inconsistent preferences, information asymmetries, failures of competition, principal–agent problems, externalities, unequal bargaining power, behavioral irrationality (in behavioral economics), and macro-economic failures (such as unemployment and inflation).
The neoclassical school attributes market failures to the interference of self-regulatory organizations, governments or supra-national institutions in a particular market, although this view is criticized by heterodox economists. Economists, especially microeconomists, are often concerned with the causes of market failure and possible means of correction. Such analysis plays an important role in many types of public policy decisions and studies.
An agency cost is an economic concept that refers to the costs associated with the relationship between a "principal" (an organization, person or group of persons), and an "agent". The agent is given powers to make decisions on behalf of the principal. However, the two parties may have different incentives and the agent generally has more information. The principal cannot directly ensure that its agent is always acting in its (the principal's) best interests. This potential divergence in interests is what gives rise to agency costs.