Verificationism, also known as the verification principle or the verifiability criterion of meaning, is a doctrine in philosophy and the philosophy of language which holds that a declarative sentence is cognitively meaningful only if it is either analytic or tautological (true or false in virtue of its logical form and definitions) or at least in principle verifiable by experience. On this view, many traditional statements of metaphysics, theology, and some of ethics and aesthetics are said to lack truth value or factual content, even though they may still function as expressions of emotions or attitudes rather than as genuine assertions. Verificationism was typically formulated as an empiricist criterion of cognitive significance: a proposed test for distinguishing meaningful, truth-apt sentences from "nonsense".
As a self-conscious movement, verificationism was a central thesis of logical positivism (or logical empiricism), developed in the 1920s and 1930s by members of the Vienna Circle and their allies in early analytic philosophy. Drawing on earlier empiricism and positivism (especially David Hume, Auguste Comte and Ernst Mach), on pragmatism (notably C. S. Peirce and William James), and on the logical and semantic innovations of Gottlob Frege and the early Wittgenstein, these philosophers sought a "scientific" conception of philosophy in which meaningful discourse would either consist in empirical claims ultimately testable by observation or in analytic truths of logic and mathematics. The verification principle was intended to explain why many traditional metaphysical disputes seemed irresolvable, to demarcate science from pseudo-science and speculative metaphysics, and to vindicate the special status of the natural sciences by taking empirical testability as the paradigm of serious inquiry.
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