Test (law) in the context of "Legal proceedings"

A legal doctrine is a framework, set of rules, procedural steps, or test, often established through precedent in the common law, through which judgments can be determined in a given legal case. For example, a doctrine comes about when a judge makes a ruling where a process is outlined and applied, and allows for it to be equally applied to like cases. When enough judges make use of the process, it may become established as the de facto method of deciding like situations.

A fixture, as a legal concept, means any physical property that is permanently attached (fixed) to real property (usually land). Property not affixed to real property is considered chattel property. Fixtures are treated as a part of real property, particularly in the case of a security interest. A classic example of a fixture is a building, which, in the absence of language to the contrary in a contract of sale, is considered part of the land itself and not a separate piece of property. Generally speaking, the test for deciding whether an article is a fixture or a chattel turns on the purpose of attachment. If the purpose was to enhance the land, the article is likely a fixture; if the article was affixed to enhance the use of the chattel itself, the article is likely a chattel.

Chattel property is converted into a fixture by the process of attachment. For example, if a piece of lumber sits in a lumber yard, it is a chattel. If the same lumber is used to build a fence on the land, it becomes a fixture to that real property. In many cases, the determination of whether property is a fixture or a chattel turns on the degree to which the property is attached to the land. For example, this problem arises in the case of a trailer home. In this case, the characterization of the home as chattel or realty will depend on how permanently it is attached, such as whether the trailer has a foundation.

"Necessary in a democratic society" is a test found in Articles 8–11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides that the state may impose restrictions of these rights only if such restrictions are "necessary in a democratic society" and proportional to the legitimate aims enumerated in each article. According to the Council of Europe's handbook on the subject, the phrase is "arguably one of the most important clauses in the entire Convention". Indeed, the Court has itself written that "the concept of a democratic society ... prevails throughout the Convention". The purpose of making such claims justiciable is to ensure that the restriction is actually necessary, rather than enacted for political expediency, which is not allowed. Articles 8–11 of the convention are those that protect right to family life, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of association respectively. Along with the other tests which are applied to these articles, the restrictions on Articles 8–11 have been described as "vast limitations", in contrast to American law which recognizes nearly unlimited right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment.

In conflict of laws, habitual residence is the standard used to determine the law which should be applied to determine a given legal dispute or entitlement. It can be contrasted with the law on domicile, traditionally used in common law jurisdictions to do the same thing.

Habitual residence is determined based on the totality of circumstances which may include both future intention and past experience. There is normally only one habitual residence where the individual usually resides and routinely returns to after visiting other places. It is the geographical place considered "home" for a reasonably significant period of time.

In United States law, the bad tendency principle was a test that permitted restriction of freedom of speech by government if it was believed that a form of speech had a sole tendency to incite or cause illegal activity. The principle, formulated in Patterson v. Colorado (1907), was seemingly overturned with the "clear and present danger" principle used in the landmark case Schenck v. United States (1919), as stated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. Yet eight months later, at the start of the next term in Abrams v. United States (1919), the Court again used the bad tendency test to uphold the conviction of a Russian immigrant who published and distributed leaflets calling for a general strike and otherwise advocated revolutionary, anarchist, and socialist views. Holmes dissented in Abrams, explaining how the clear and present danger test should be employed to overturn Abrams' conviction. The re-emergence of the bad tendency test resulted in a string of cases, after Abrams, employing that test, including Whitney v. California (1927), where a woman was convicted simply because of her association with the Communist Party. The court ruled unanimously that although she had not committed any crimes, her relationship with the Communists represented a "bad tendency" and thus was unprotected. The "bad tendency" test was finally overturned in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) and was replaced by the "imminent lawless action" test.

In legal terminology, the assured clear distance ahead (ACDA) is the distance ahead of any terrestrial locomotive device such as a land vehicle, typically an automobile, or watercraft, within which they should be able to bring the device to a halt. It is one of the most fundamental principles governing ordinary care and the duty of care for all methods of conveyance, and is frequently used to determine if a driver is in proper control and is a nearly universally implicit consideration in vehicular accident liability. The rule is a precautionary trivial burden required to avert the great probable gravity of precious life loss and momentous damage. Satisfying the ACDA rule is necessary but not sufficient to comply with the more generalized basic speed law, and accordingly, it may be used as both a layman's criterion and judicial test for courts to use in determining if a particular speed is negligent, but not to prove it is safe. As a spatial standard of care, it also serves as required explicit and fair notice of prohibited conduct so unsafe speed laws are not void for vagueness. The concept has transcended into accident reconstruction and engineering.

This distance is typically both determined and constrained by the proximate edge of clear visibility, but it may be attenuated to a margin of which beyond hazards may reasonably be expected to spontaneously appear. The rule is the specific spatial case of the common law basic speed rule, and an application of volenti non fit injuria. The two-second rule may be the limiting factor governing the ACDA, when the speed of forward traffic is what limits the basic safe speed, and a primary hazard of collision could result from following any closer.

In law, a balancing test is any judicial test in which the jurists weigh the importance of multiple factors in a legal case. Proponents of such legal tests argue that they allow a deeper consideration of complex issues than a bright-line rule can allow. But critics say that such tests can be used to justify any conclusion, upon which the judge might arbitrarily decide.

In the United States, many legal issues, which had previously been considered settled by the imposition of bright-line tests through Supreme Court precedents, have been replaced by balancing tests in recent years.