Rearguard in the context of "Skirmish"

Skirmishers are light infantry or light cavalry soldiers deployed as a vanguard, flank guard or rearguard to screen a tactical position or a larger body of friendly troops from enemy advances. They may be deployed in a skirmish line, an irregular open formation that is much more spread out in depth and in breadth than a traditional line formation. Their purpose is to harass the enemy by engaging them in only light or sporadic combat to delay their movement, disrupt their attack, or weaken their morale. Such tactics are collectively called skirmishing. An engagement with only light, relatively indecisive combat is sometimes called a skirmish even if heavier troops are sometimes involved.

Skirmishers can be either regular army units that are temporarily detached to perform skirmishing or specialty units that were specifically armed and trained for such low-level irregular warfare tactics. Light infantry, light cavalry (historically), and irregular units often specialize in skirmishing. Skirmishers' open formations and smaller numbers can give them superior mobility over the regular forces, allowing them to engage only on favorable terms, taking advantage of better position or terrain, and quickly withdrawing from any threat of superior enemy forces. Though often critical in protecting the main army from sudden enemy advances, skirmishers were historically poor at taking or defending ground from heavy infantry or heavy cavalry.

The Battle of Dresden (26–27 August 1813) was a major engagement of the Napoleonic Wars. The battle took place around the city of Dresden in modern-day Germany. With the recent addition of Austria, the Sixth Coalition felt emboldened in their quest to expel the French from Central Europe. Despite being heavily outnumbered, French forces under Napoleon scored a victory against the Army of Bohemia led by Generalissimo Karl von Schwarzenberg. However, Napoleon's victory did not lead to the collapse of the coalition, and the weather and the uncommitted Russian reserves who formed an effective rearguard precluded a major pursuit. Three days after the battle, the Coalition surrounded and destroyed a French corps advancing into their line of withdrawal at the Battle of Kulm.

Historian Modest Bogdanovich summarized the battle and noted the following details. 'Both the city itself and its surroundings presented a picture of anxiety and devastation. Napoleon, in turn, was justifiably proud of his success. The allies had almost double the cavalry, and they also had the advantage in artillery. Napoleon's troops consisted almost exclusively of fresh conscripts, while the allies had many veterans. But these advantages could not compensate for the lack of unity of command, the speed of common understanding, and the execution of actions. Many of the individual commanders, for example, Zieten and Colloredo, covered themselves with glory, and the troops fought very bravely, but at their head was Schwarzenberg, and at the head of the French was Napoleon. Neither even the experience of Moreau nor the profound knowledge of Jomini, the French apostates who participated on the Imperial-Russian side, could compensate for the shortcomings.'