Rapid Support Forces in the context of 2021 Sudanese coup d'état

The Janjaweed (Arabic: جنجويد, romanized: Janjawīd) are a Sudanese Arab nomad militia group operating in the Sahel region, specifically in Sudan, particularly in Darfur and eastern Chad. They have also been speculated to be active in Yemen. According to the United Nations definition, Janjaweed membership consists of Arab nomad tribes from the Sahel, the core of whom are Abbala Arabs, traditionally employed in camel herding, with significant recruitment from the Baggara.

Janjaweed nomads were initially at odds with Darfur's sedentary population due to competition over grazing grounds and farmland, a conflict exacerbated by drought. The Janjaweed were a major player in the Darfur conflict between 2003 and 2020, in opposition to the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement rebels. In 2013, the Rapid Support Forces grew out of the Janjaweed.

The Rizeigat (also spelled Rizigat, Rezeigat, and in standard Arabic, Rizayqat) are a Muslim and an Arab tribe of the nomadic Baggara people predominantly in Sudan's Darfur region and Chad. The Rizeigat belong to the greater Baggara Arabs fraternity of Darfur and Chad, and speak both Sudanese and Chadian Arabic. They are primarily nomadic herders and their journeys are dependent upon the seasons of the year. They are a branch of the Juhayna group. They are divided into the Abbala (camel-herding) Rizeigat, who live in northern Darfur and Chad, and the Baggara who inhabit south-east Darfur. In turn they are divided into several large clans, notably the Mahamid, Mahariya and Nawaiba. The ecological differences between the north and south of Sudan allowed for two different types of nomadism to evolve: camel herders in the north and cattle herders in the south. They are a substantial part of the Janjaweed turned Rapid Support Forces.

The Baggara Rizeigat backed the Sudanese government during the conflict with the SPLA. They formed the Murahileen, mounted raiders that attacked southern villages to loot valuables and slaves.During the Second Sudanese Civil War thousands of Dinka women and children were abducted and subsequently enslaved by members of the Messiria and Rizeigat tribes. An unknown number of children from the Nuba tribe were similarly abducted and enslaved.

Since 15 April 2023, there has been an active civil war in Sudan between two rival factions of the country's military government. The conflict involves the internationally recognized government controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Republican Guard; and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Hemedti, who leads the broader Janjaweed coalition. Several smaller armed groups have also taken part. Fighting began on 15 April 2023 after a power struggle within the military government that had taken power following the October 2021 coup. The conflict has caused nearly 12 million people to be forcibly displaced, both inside Sudan and across its borders, making it one of the largest displacement crises in recent history.

Fighting was largely concentrated in the capital, Khartoum, where the conflict began with the Battle of Khartoum, and in the Darfur region. Many civilians in Darfur have been reported dead as part of the Masalit genocide, which have been described as ethnic cleansing or genocide. Sudan has been described as facing the world's worst humanitarian crisis; nearly 25 million people are experiencing extreme hunger according to UN estimates. On 7 January 2025, the United States said it had determined that the RSF and allied militias committed genocide.

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF; Arabic: القوات المسلحة السودانية, romanized: Al-Qūwāt Al-Musallaḥah as-Sūdāniyah) are the military forces of the Republic of Sudan. The force strength has been estimated at 109,300 personnel in 2011 (by IISS), 200,000 personnel before the current war in Sudan broke out in 2023 (by the CIA), and 300,000 personnel in 2024 (by Al Jazeera).

In 2016–2017, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) had 40,000 members participating in the Yemeni Civil War (of which 10,000 returned to Sudan by October 2019). As of 2025, the SAF and RSF remain in armed conflict against one another in the ongoing civil war in Sudan.

Khamis Abdallah Abakar (Arabic: خميس عبد الله أبكر; 30 March 1964 – 14 June 2023) also known as Khamis Abakar was a Sudanese politician, marginalized groups rights activist and former army commander who served as the Governor of West Darfur from 2021 until his assassination.

Prior to being governor, Abakar headed a faction of the Sudanese Liberation Movement, which fought the Sudanese military and Janjaweed (later the Rapid Support Forces) during the War in Darfur. In 2020, Abakar's faction of the SLM signed the Juba Peace Agreement, and Abakar was appointed Governor of West Darfur a year later.

The Darfur genocide, also known as the second Darfur genocide, is an ongoing series of persecutions and mass killings of non-Arabs in Darfur carried out by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and its allies during the Sudanese civil war. The genocidal campaign started on 15 April 2023 in conjunction with civil war between the RSF and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The RSF and allied militias began committing organized massacres of non-Arab civilians in all states of Darfur, with the largest occurring throughout 2023 against the Masalit people in the area of Geneina, West Darfur. The genocide has been recognized by Genocide Watch, the government of the United States, and American academic Eric Reeves.

Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo Musa (born c. 1973-1975), commonly known by the mononym Hemedti, is a Sudanese military officer and politician who is serving as the chairman of the presidential council of the Government of Peace and Unity since 2025. He is also the military head of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), one of the two main factions involved in the Sudanese civil war along with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

A Janjaweed chief from the Rizeigat tribe in Darfur, Hemedti was one of the warlords leading the Janjaweed in the war in Darfur and is accused by several organizations to be one of the perpetrators of the Darfur genocide (2003–2005). Hemedti later joined the RSF and has served as its military head since 2013. He took part in the revolution against President Omar al-Bashir, and, following the 2019 Sudanese coup d'état, became the deputy head of the Transitional Military Council (TMC). On 21 August 2019, the TMC transferred power to the civilian–military Transitional Sovereignty Council, of which Hemedti is a member. As of 2019, Hemedti was considered one of the richest people in Sudan via his company, al-Junaid, which had a wide array of business interests including investment, mining, transport, car rental, iron and steel. On behalf of the TMC, Hemedti signed a political agreement on 17 July 2019 and the Draft Constitutional Declaration on 4 August 2019, together with Ahmed Rabee on behalf of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), as major steps in the 2019 Sudanese transition to democracy. Under Article 19 of the Draft Constitutional Declaration, Hemedti and the other Sovereignty Council members would be ineligible to run in the next Sudanese general election. In September 2019, Hemedti helped negotiate a peace deal between groups in armed conflict in Port Sudan.

The Battle of Khartoum was a major strategic battle for control of Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, with fighting in and around the city between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), as part of the civil war. The battle began on 15 April 2023, after the RSF captured Khartoum International Airport, several military bases, and the presidential palace in an attempted coup d'état, starting an escalating series of clashes. The battle was also the longest continuous battle in Sudanese history, the longest battle in an African capital ever, the longest in North African history and is one of the deadliest recorded battles in Sudanese and African history, with over 61,000 deaths. The battle was also marked by its gruelling urban warfare.

It was initially reported that tensions rose in Khartoum and Merowe on 13 April 2023, when RSF forces mobilized. In response, the SAF issued a statement saying "There is a possibility of a confrontation between SAF and RSF forces" introducing fears of a wider conflict. In the evening of 14 April 2023, RSF forces assaulted the Khartoum International Airport, a military base, and the presidential palace. The fighting spread from Khartoum into its suburbs, primarily Omdurman, where its bridge on the White Nile was largely captured by the RSF forces. On 26 March 2025, the SAF claimed victory after expelling RSF forces from most of Khartoum, including the airport and the presidential palace.