Pramāṇa in the context of "Śabda"

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⭐ Core Definition: Pramāṇa

Pramana (Sanskrit: प्रमाण; IAST: Pramāṇa) literally means "proof" and "means of knowledge". One of the core concepts in Indian epistemology, pramanas are one or more reliable and valid means by which human beings gain accurate, true knowledge. The focus of pramana is how correct knowledge can be acquired, how one knows, how one does not know, and to what extent knowledge pertinent about someone or something can be acquired.

While the number of pramanas varies widely from system to system, many ancient and medieval Indian texts identify six pramanas as correct means of accurate knowledge and attaining to the truth. Three of these are almost universally accepted: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and "word" (śabda), meaning the testimony of past or present reliable experts. The other three pramanas are more contentious: comparison and analogy (upamāna); postulation or derivation from circumstances (arthāpatti); and non-perception, or proof from absence (anupalabdhi). Each of these are further categorized in terms of conditionality, completeness, confidence, and possibility of error.

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Pramāṇa in the context of Buddhist logico-epistemology

Buddhist logico-epistemology is a term used in Western scholarship to describe Buddhist systems of pramāṇa (epistemic tool, valid cognition) and hetu-vidya (reasoning, logic).

While the term may refer to various Buddhist systems and views on reasoning and epistemology, it is most often used to refer to the work of the "Epistemological school" (Sanskrit: Pramāṇa-vāda), i.e., the school of Dignaga and Dharmakirti which developed from the 5th through 7th centuries and remained the main system of Buddhist reasoning until the decline of Buddhism in India.

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Pramāṇa in the context of Dignāga


Dignāga (also known as Diṅnāga, c. 470/480 – c. 530/540 CE) was an Indian Buddhist philosopher and logician. He is credited as one of the Buddhist founders of Indian logic (hetu vidyā) and atomism. Dignāga's work laid the groundwork for the development of deductive logic in India and created the first system of Buddhist logic and epistemology (pramāṇa).

According to Georges B. Dreyfus, his philosophical school brought about an Indian "epistemological turn" and became the "standard formulation of Buddhist logic and epistemology in India and Tibet." Dignāga's thought influenced later Buddhist philosophers like Dharmakīrti and also Hindu thinkers of the Nyāya school. Dignāga's epistemology accepted only "perception" (pratyaksa) and "inference" (anumāṇa) as valid instruments of knowledge and introduced the widely influential theory of "exclusion" (apoha) to explain linguistic meaning. His work on language, inferential reasoning and perception were also widely influential among later Indian philosophers. According to Richard P. Hayes "some familiarity with Dinnaga's arguments and conclusions is indispensable for anyone who wishes to understand the historical development of Indian thought."

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Pramāṇa in the context of Dharmakirti

Dharmakīrti (fl. c. 600–670 CE) was an influential Indian Buddhist philosopher who worked at Nālandā. He was one of the key scholars of epistemology (pramāṇa) in Buddhist philosophy, and is associated with the Yogācāra and Sautrāntika schools. He was also one of the primary theorists of Buddhist atomism. His works influenced the scholars of Mīmāṃsā, Nyaya and Shaivism schools of Hindu philosophy as well as scholars of Jainism.

Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika, his largest and most important work, was very influential in India and Tibet as a central text on pramana ('valid knowledge instruments'), and was widely commented on by various Indian and Tibetan scholars. His texts remain part of studies in the monasteries of Tibetan Buddhism.

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