Mind-body dualism in the context of "Supervenience"

Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself. Substances are particulars that are ontologically independent: they are able to exist all by themselves. Another defining feature often attributed to substances is their ability to undergo changes. Changes involve something existing before, during and after the change. They can be described in terms of a persisting substance gaining or losing properties. Attributes or properties, on the other hand, are entities that can be exemplified by substances. Properties characterize their bearers; they express what their bearer is like.

Substance is a key concept in ontology, the latter in turn part of metaphysics, which may be classified into monist, dualist, or pluralist varieties according to how many substances or individuals are said to populate, furnish, or exist in the world. According to monistic views, there is only one substance. Stoicism and Spinoza, for example, hold monistic views, that pneuma or God, respectively, is the one substance in the world. These modes of thinking are sometimes associated with the idea of immanence. Dualism sees the world as being composed of two fundamental substances (for example, the Cartesian substance dualism of mind and matter). Pluralist philosophies include Plato's Theory of Forms and Aristotle's hylomorphic categories.

Mental substance, according to the idea held by dualists and idealists, is a non-physical substance of which minds are composed. This substance is often referred to as consciousness.

This is opposed to the view of materialists, who hold that what we normally think of as mental substance is ultimately physical matter (i.e., brains).

Res extensa is one of the two substances described by René Descartes in his Cartesian ontology (often referred to as "radical dualism"), alongside res cogitans. Translated from Latin, "res extensa" means "extended thing" while the latter is described as "a thinking and unextended thing". Descartes often translated res extensa as "corporeal substance" but it is something that only God can create.

Dualism in Indian philosophy is a belief, or large spectrum of beliefs, held by certain schools of Indian philosophy that reality is fundamentally composed of two parts or two types of existence. This mainly takes the form of either mind-matter dualism, as in some strands of Buddhist philosophy, or consciousness-nonconsciousness dualism in the Samkhya and Yoga schools of Hindu philosophy. These can be compared and contrasted with mind-body dualism in Western philosophy of mind and metaphysics.

Another form of dualism in Hindu philosophy is found in the Dvaita ("dualism") Vedanta school, which regards God and the world as two realities with distinct essences; this is a form of theistic dualism. By contrast, schools such as Advaita ("nondualism") Vedanta embrace nondualism or absolute monism, regarding dualism as an illusion (maya).

Epistemological pluralism is a term used in philosophy, economics, and virtually any field of study to refer to different ways of knowing things; different epistemological methodologies for attaining a fuller description of a particular field. A particular form of epistemological pluralism is dualism, for example, the separation of methods for investigating mind from those appropriate to matter (see mind–body problem). By contrast, monism is the restriction to a single approach, for example, reductionism, which asserts the study of all phenomena can be seen as finding relations to some few basic entities.

Epistemological pluralism is to be distinguished from ontological pluralism, the study of different modes of being, for example, the contrast in the mode of existence exhibited by "numbers" with that of "people" or "cars".

Elisabeth of the Palatinate (German: Elisabeth von der Pfalz; 26 December 1618 – 11 February 1680), also known as Elisabeth of Bohemia (Elisabeth von Böhmen), Princess Elisabeth of the Palatinate, or Princess-Abbess of Herford Abbey, was the eldest daughter of Frederick V, Elector Palatine (who was briefly King of Bohemia), and Elizabeth Stuart. Elisabeth of the Palatinate was a philosopher best known for her correspondence with René Descartes. She was critical of Descartes' dualistic metaphysics and her work anticipated the metaphysical concerns of later philosophers.

"Nomological danglers" is a term used by Scottish-Australian philosopher J. J. C. Smart in his article "Sensations and Brain Processes". Smart credits the term to Herbert Feigl and his article "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'." A nomological dangler refers to the occurrence of something (in this case a sensation) that does not fit into the system of established laws. Smart believes that it is absurd that everything can be explained by the laws of physics except consciousness. He identifies consciousness with the broad term "sensations". In his example the nomological danglers would be sensations such that are not able to be explained by the scientific theory of brain processes. Some mental entities for example in a phenomenological field, are not able to be found (and do not behave in the way that is expected) in physics. In the context Smart uses it, he is criticising dualism and epiphenomenalism as philosophies of mind, and the concerns over physical and causal laws they raise. Smart puts forward his own theory in the form of materialism, claiming it is a better theory, in part because it is free from these nomological danglers, making it superior in accordance with Occam's razor. To add something that that operated according to a different "law" would effectively be to a new thing that is a law unto itself.