Grand strategy in the context of "Force structure"

Isolationism is a term used to refer to a political philosophy advocating a foreign policy that opposes involvement in the political affairs, and especially the wars, of other countries. Thus, isolationism fundamentally advocates neutrality and opposes entanglement in military alliances and mutual defense pacts. In its purest form, isolationism opposes all commitments to foreign countries, including treaties and trade agreements. In the political science lexicon, there is also the term of "non-interventionism", which is sometimes improperly used to replace the concept of "isolationism". "Non-interventionism" is commonly understood as "a foreign policy of political or military non-involvement in foreign relations or in other countries' internal affairs". "Isolationism" should be interpreted more broadly as "a foreign policy grand strategy of military and political non-interference in international affairs and in the internal affairs of sovereign states, associated with trade and economic protectionism and cultural and religious isolation, as well as with the inability to be in permanent military alliances, with the preservation, however, some opportunities to participate in temporary military alliances that meet the current interests of the state and in permanent international organizations of a non-military nature."

This contrasts with philosophies such as colonialism, expansionism, and liberal internationalism.

Civil control of the military is a doctrine in military and political science that places ultimate responsibility for a country's strategic decision-making in the hands of the state's civil authority, rather than completely with professional military leadership itself. As such, a "fundamental requirement of any nation is to ensure that the activities of its armed forces be subordinated to the political purposes of constitutional government; hence, the armed forces must be under civil control". The concept of civil control falls within the overarching concept of civil-military relations representing the "societal imperative that the military remain subordinate to civil authority and that it reflect, to an appropriate degree, societal values and norms".

Civil oversight over militaries puts the power to take military action in the hands of a civil authority, such as through government ministers or legislative bodies, or the democratic apparatus of the Crown in constitutional monarchies. Allowing the civil component of government to retain control over the military or state security illustrates the power of the citizenry, a healthy respect for democratic values, and what can be described as good governance. Giving power to the civil component of the government over what the military can do and how much money it can spend protects the democratic process from abuse. Nations that can achieve legitimate relationship between the two structures serve to be more effective and provide accountability between government and military.

The strategy of the Roman military contains its grand strategy (the arrangements made by the state to implement its political goals through a selection of military goals, a process of diplomacy backed by threat of military action, and a dedication to the military of part of its production and resources), operational strategy (the coordination and combination of the military forces and their tactics for the goals of an overarching strategy) and, on a small scale, its military tactics (methods for military engagement in order to defeat the enemy). If a fourth rung of "engagement" is added, then the whole can be seen as a ladder, with each level from the foot upwards representing a decreasing concentration on military engagement. Whereas the purest form of tactics or engagement are those free of political imperative, the purest form of political policy does not involve military engagement. Strategy as a whole is the connection between political policy and the use of force to achieve it.

The Monroe Doctrine is a United States foreign policy position that opposes European colonialism in the Western Hemisphere. It holds that any intervention in the political affairs of the Americas by foreign powers is a potentially hostile act against the United States. The doctrine was central to American grand strategy in the 20th century.

President James Monroe first articulated the doctrine on December 2, 1823, during his seventh annual State of the Union Address to Congress (though it was not named after him until 1850). At the time, nearly all Spanish colonies in the Americas had either achieved or were close to independence. Monroe asserted that the New World and the Old World were to remain distinctly separate spheres of influence, and thus further efforts by European powers to control or influence sovereign states in the region would be viewed as a threat to U.S. security. In turn, the United States would recognize and not interfere with existing European colonies nor meddle in the internal affairs of European countries.

Europe first, also known as Germany first, was the key element of the grand strategy agreed upon by the United States and the United Kingdom during World War II after the United States joined the war in December 1941. According to this policy, the United States and the United Kingdom would use the preponderance of their resources to subdue Nazi Germany in Europe first. Simultaneously, they would fight a holding action against Japan in the Pacific, using fewer resources. After the defeat of Germany—considered the greatest threat to the UK and the Soviet Union—all Allied forces could be concentrated against Japan.

At the December 1941 Arcadia Conference between President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Washington, shortly after the United States entered the War, the decision for the "Europe First" strategy was affirmed. However, U.S. statistics show that the United States devoted more resources in the early part of the war to stopping the advance of Japan, and not until 1944 was a clear preponderance of U.S. resources allocated toward the defeat of Germany.

Edward Nicolae Luttwak (born 4 November 1942) is an American author known for his works on grand strategy, military strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations. He is best known for being the author of Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook. His book Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, also published in Chinese, Russian and ten other languages, is widely used at war colleges around the world. His books are currently published in 29 languages besides English.

Hide your strength, bide your time (Traditional Chinese: 韜光養晦; Simplified Chinese: 韬光养晦) is a political slogan of the People's Republic of China, typically used to describe a tenet of China's foreign policy. It is commonly attributed to Deng Xiaoping, although the phrase was in fact coined by his successor, Jiang Zemin.

Construed literally, the first part of the slogan, "taoguang", refers to concealing one's fame or talent, while "yanghui" means to retreat from public life. The combined term, "taohui" is also used to describe a tactic of hiding one's abilities, biding time, and waiting for the right moment.