Excuse in the context of "Defense of infancy"

The age of criminal responsibility is the age below which a child is deemed incapable of having committed a criminal offence. In legal terms, it is referred to as a defence/defense of infancy, which is a form of defense known as an excuse so that defendants falling within the definition of an "infant" are excluded from criminal liability for their actions, if at the relevant time, they had not reached an age of criminal responsibility. After reaching the initial age, there may be levels of responsibility dictated by age and the type of offense committed.

Under the English common law the defense of infancy was expressed as a set of presumptions in a doctrine known as doli incapax. A child under the age of seven was presumed incapable of committing a crime. The presumption was conclusive, prohibiting the prosecution from offering evidence that the child had the capacity to appreciate the nature and wrongfulness of what they had done. Children aged 7–13 were presumed incapable of committing a crime but the presumption was rebuttable. The prosecution could overcome the presumption by proving that the child understood what they were doing and that it was wrong. In fact, capacity was a necessary element of the state's case (thus, the rule of sevens doctrine arose). If the state failed to offer sufficient evidence of capacity, the infant was entitled to have the charges dismissed at the close of the state's evidence. Doli incapax was abolished in England and Wales in 1998 for children over the age of 10, but persists in other common law jurisdictions.

In criminal law, consent may be used as an excuse and prevent the defendant from incurring liability for what was done.

Justification is a defense in a criminal case, by which a defendant who committed the acts asserts that because what they did meets certain legal standards, they are not criminally culpable for the acts which would otherwise be criminal. Justification and excuse are related but different defenses (see Justification and excuse).

Justification is an exception to the prohibition of committing certain offenses. Justification can be a defense in a prosecution for a criminal offense. When an act is justified, a person is not criminally liable even though their act would otherwise constitute an offense. For example, to intentionally commit a homicide would be considered murder. However, it is not considered a crime if committed in self-defense. In addition to self-defense, the other justification defenses are defense of others, defense of property, and necessity.

In criminal law, diminished responsibility (or diminished capacity) is a potential defense by excuse by which defendants argue that although they broke the law, they should not be held fully criminally liable for doing so, as their mental functions were "diminished" or impaired.

The right of self-defense is the right for people as individuals to commit a crime, violent or non-violent, for the purpose of defending their own life (self-defense) and property, or to defend the lives of others, in certain circumstances. For example, while reckless driving is usually against the law, it can be justified if it was done to avoid a collision. The right, when it applies to the defense of another, is also called alter ego defense, defense of others, defense of a third person. Nations and states also have a right to self-defense in relation to their existence and independence.

In criminal law, if a defendant commits a crime because of a threat of deadly or grievous harm, or a reasonable perception of such harm, the defendant is said to have a "perfect self-defense" justification. If a defendant commits a crime because of such a perception, and the perception is not reasonable, the defendant may have "imperfect self-defense" as an excuse.

Trespass to land, also called trespass to realty or trespass to real property, or sometimes simply trespass, is a common law tort or a crime that is committed when an individual or the object of an individual intentionally (or, in Australia, negligently) enters the land of another without a lawful excuse. Trespass to land is actionable per se. Thus, the party whose land is entered upon may sue even if no actual harm is done. In some jurisdictions, this rule may also apply to entry upon public land having restricted access. A court may order payment of damages or an injunction to remedy the tort.

By law, trespass for mesne profits is a suit against someone who has been ejected from property that did not belong to them. The suit is for recovery of damages the trespasser caused to the property and for any profits he or she may have made while in possession of that property.

The insanity defense, also known as the mental disorder defense, is an affirmative defense by excuse in a criminal case, arguing that the defendant is not responsible for their actions due to a psychiatric disease at the time of the criminal act. This is contrasted with an excuse of provocation, in which the defendant is responsible, but the responsibility is lessened due to a temporary mental state. It is also contrasted with the justification of self defense or with the mitigation of imperfect self-defense. The insanity defense is also contrasted with a finding that a defendant cannot stand trial in a criminal case because a mental disease prevents them from effectively assisting counsel, from a civil finding in trusts and estates where a will is nullified because it was made when a mental disorder prevented a testator from recognizing the natural objects of their bounty, and from involuntary civil commitment to a mental institution, when anyone is found to be gravely disabled or to be a danger to themself or to others.

Legal definitions of insanity or mental disorder are varied, and include the M'Naghten Rule, the Durham rule, the 1953 British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment report, the ALI rule (American Legal Institute Model Penal Code rule), and other provisions, often relating to a lack of mens rea ("guilty mind"). In the criminal laws of Australia and Canada, statutory legislation enshrines the M'Naghten Rules, with the terms "defense of mental disorder", "defense of mental illness", or "not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder" employed. Being incapable of distinguishing right from wrong is one basis for being found to be legally insane as a criminal defense. It originated in the M'Naghten Rule, and has been reinterpreted and modernized through more recent cases, such as People v. Serravo.

Justification and excuse are different defenses in a United States criminal case. Both defenses admit that the defendant committed an act proscribed by law. The proscribed act has justification if the act had positive effects that outweigh its negative effects, or is not wrong or blameworthy. The proscribed act is excused if the defendant's violation was not entirely voluntary, such as if they acted under duress or under a false belief. Martin v. Ohio (1986) established that states may make justification an affirmative defense, placing the burden of proof on defendant. Patterson v. New York (1977) established that states may make excuses, such as involving mental state, an affirmative defense, rather than part of the mens rea element the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

"Conduct... may be either justified... or excused... A defense of justification is the product of society's determination that the actual existence of certain circumstances will operate to make proper and legal what otherwise would be criminal conduct. A defense of excuse, contrarily, does not make legal and proper conduct which ordinarily would result in criminal liability; instead, it openly recognizes the criminality of the conduct but excuses it because the actor believed that circumstances actually existed which would justify his conduct when in fact they did not. In short, had the facts been as he supposed them to be, the actor's conduct would have been justified rather than excused..."