Classical logic in the context of Non-classical logic

The material conditional (also known as material implication) is a binary operation commonly used in logic. When the conditional symbol ${\displaystyle \to }$ is interpreted as material implication, a formula ${\displaystyle P\to Q}$ is true unless ${\displaystyle P}$ is true and ${\displaystyle Q}$ is false.

Material implication is used in all the basic systems of classical logic as well as some nonclassical logics. It is assumed as a model of correct conditional reasoning within mathematics and serves as the basis for commands in many programming languages. However, many logics replace material implication with other operators such as the strict conditional and the variably strict conditional. Due to the paradoxes of material implication and related problems, material implication is not generally considered a viable analysis of conditional sentences in natural language.

Bertrand Arthur William Russell, 3rd Earl Russell (18 May 1872 – 2 February 1970), was a British philosopher, logician, mathematician, and public intellectual. He influenced mathematics, logic, set theory, and various areas of analytic philosophy.

He was one of the early 20th century's prominent logicians and a founder of analytic philosophy, along with his predecessor Gottlob Frege, his friend and colleague G. E. Moore, and his student and protégé Ludwig Wittgenstein. Russell with Moore led the British "revolt against idealism". Together with his former teacher Alfred North Whitehead, Russell wrote Principia Mathematica, a milestone in the development of classical logic and a major attempt to reduce the whole of mathematics to logic (see logicism). Russell's article "On Denoting" has been considered a "paradigm of philosophy".

In logic and mathematics, a truth value, sometimes called a logical value, is a value indicating the relation of a proposition to truth, which in classical logic has only two possible values (true or false). Truth values are used in computing as well as various types of logic.

Pluralism is a term used in philosophy, referring to a worldview of multiplicity, often used in opposition to monism (the view that all is one) or dualism (the view that all is two). The term has different meanings in metaphysics, ontology, epistemology and logic. In metaphysics, it is the view that there are in fact many different substances in nature that constitute reality. In ontology, pluralism refers to different ways, kinds, or modes of being. For example, a topic in ontological pluralism is the comparison of the modes of existence of things like 'humans' and 'cars' with things like 'numbers' and some other concepts as they are used in science.

In epistemology, pluralism is the position that there is not one consistent means of approaching truths about the world, but rather many. Often this is associated with pragmatism, or conceptual, contextual, or cultural relativism. In the philosophy of science it may refer to the acceptance of co-existing scientific paradigms which though accurately describing their relevant domains are nonetheless incommensurable. In logic, pluralism is the relatively novel view that there is no one correct logic, or alternatively, that there is more than one correct logic. Such as using classical logic in most cases, but using paraconsistent logic to deal with certain paradoxes.

Understood in a narrow sense, philosophical logic is the area of logic that studies the application of logical methods to philosophical problems, often in the form of extended logical systems like modal logic. Some theorists conceive philosophical logic in a wider sense as the study of the scope and nature of logic in general. In this sense, philosophical logic can be seen as identical to the philosophy of logic, which includes additional topics like how to define logic or a discussion of the fundamental concepts of logic. The current article treats philosophical logic in the narrow sense, in which it forms one field of inquiry within the philosophy of logic.

An important issue for philosophical logic is the question of how to classify the great variety of non-classical logical systems, many of which are of rather recent origin. One form of classification often found in the literature is to distinguish between extended logics and deviant logics. Logic itself can be defined as the study of valid inference. Classical logic is the dominant form of logic and articulates rules of inference in accordance with logical intuitions shared by many, like the law of excluded middle, the double negation elimination, and the bivalence of truth.

In classical logic, disjunctive syllogism (historically known as modus tollendo ponens (MTP), Latin for "mode that affirms by denying") is a valid argument form which is a syllogism having a disjunctive statement for one of its premises.

An example in English:

In classical logic, a hypothetical syllogism is a valid argument form, a deductive syllogism with a conditional statement for one or both of its premises. Ancient references point to the works of Theophrastus and Eudemus for the first investigation of this kind of syllogisms.

In logic, disjunction (also known as logical disjunction, logical or, logical addition, or inclusive disjunction) is a logical connective typically notated as ${\displaystyle \lor }$ and read aloud as "or". For instance, the English language sentence "it is sunny or it is warm" can be represented in logic using the disjunctive formula ${\displaystyle S\lor W}$, assuming that ${\displaystyle S}$ abbreviates "it is sunny" and ${\displaystyle W}$ abbreviates "it is warm".

In classical logic, disjunction is given a truth functional semantics according to which a formula ${\displaystyle \phi \lor \psi }$ is true unless both ${\displaystyle \phi }$ and ${\displaystyle \psi }$ are false. Because this semantics allows a disjunctive formula to be true when both of its disjuncts are true, it is an inclusive interpretation of disjunction, in contrast with exclusive disjunction. Classical proof theoretical treatments are often given in terms of rules such as disjunction introduction and disjunction elimination. Disjunction has also been given numerous non-classical treatments, motivated by problems including Aristotle's sea battle argument, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, as well as the numerous mismatches between classical disjunction and its nearest equivalents in natural languages.

In logic, negation, also called the logical not or logical complement, is an operation that takes a proposition ${\displaystyle P}$ to another proposition "not ${\displaystyle P}$", written ${\displaystyle \neg P}$, ${\displaystyle {\mathord {\sim }}P}$, ${\displaystyle P^{\prime }}$ or ${\displaystyle {\overline {P}}}$. It is interpreted intuitively as being true when ${\displaystyle P}$ is false, and false when ${\displaystyle P}$ is true. For example, if ${\displaystyle P}$ is "The dog runs", then "not ${\displaystyle P}$" is "The dog does not run". An operand of a negation is called a negand or negatum.

Negation is a unary logical connective. It may furthermore be applied not only to propositions, but also to notions, truth values, or semantic values more generally. In classical logic, negation is normally identified with the truth function that takes truth to falsity (and vice versa). In intuitionistic logic, according to the Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov interpretation, the negation of a proposition ${\displaystyle P}$ is the proposition whose proofs are the refutations of ${\displaystyle P}$.

In logic, a truth function is a function that accepts truth values as input and produces a unique truth value as output. In other words: the input and output of a truth function are all truth values; a truth function will always output exactly one truth value, and inputting the same truth value(s) will always output the same truth value. The typical example is in propositional logic, wherein a compound statement is constructed using individual statements connected by logical connectives; if the truth value of the compound statement is entirely determined by the truth value(s) of the constituent statement(s), the compound statement is called a truth function, and any logical connectives used are said to be truth functional.

Classical propositional logic is a truth-functional logic, in that every statement has exactly one truth value which is either true or false, and every logical connective is truth functional (with a correspondent truth table), thus every compound statement is a truth function. On the other hand, modal logic is non-truth-functional.

Non-classical logics (and sometimes alternative logics or non-Aristotelian logics) are formal systems that differ in a significant way from standard logical systems such as propositional and predicate logic. There are several ways in which this is commonly the case, including by way of extensions, deviations, and variations. The aim of these departures is to make it possible to construct different models of logical consequence and logical truth.

Philosophical logic is understood to encompass and focus on non-classical logics, although the term has other meanings as well. In addition, some parts of theoretical computer science can be thought of as using non-classical reasoning, although this varies according to the subject area. For example, the basic boolean functions (e.g. AND, OR, NOT, etc) in computer science are very much classical in nature, as is clearly the case given that they can be fully described by classical truth tables. However, in contrast, some computerized proof methods may not use classical logic in the reasoning process.

In logic, a strict conditional (symbol: ${\displaystyle \Box }$, or ⥽) is a conditional governed by a modal operator, that is, a logical connective of modal logic. It is logically equivalent to the material conditional of classical logic, combined with the necessity operator from modal logic. For any two propositions p and q, the formula p → q says that p materially implies q while ${\displaystyle \Box (p\rightarrow q)}$ says that p strictly implies q. Strict conditionals are the result of Clarence Irving Lewis's attempt to find a conditional for logic that can adequately express indicative conditionals in natural language. They have also been used in studying Molinist theology.

The paradoxes of material implication are a group of classically true formulae involving material conditionals whose translations into natural language are intuitively false when the conditional is translated with English words such as "implies" or "if ... then ...". They are sometimes phrased as arguments, since they are easily turned into arguments with modus ponens: if it is true that "if ${\displaystyle P}$ then ${\displaystyle Q}$" (${\displaystyle P\rightarrow Q}$), then from that together with ${\displaystyle P}$, one may argue for ${\displaystyle Q}$. Among them are the following:

A material conditional formula ${\displaystyle P\rightarrow Q}$ is true unless ${\displaystyle P}$ is true and ${\displaystyle Q}$ is false; it is synonymous with "either P is false, or Q is true, or both". This gives rise to vacuous truths such as, "if 2+2=5, then this Wikipedia article is accurate", which is true regardless of the contents of this article, because the antecedent is false. Given that such problematic consequences follow from an extremely popular and widely accepted model of reasoning, namely the material implication in classical logic, they are called paradoxes. They demonstrate a mismatch between classical logic and robust intuitions about meaning and reasoning.

In logic, a quantifier is an operator that specifies how many individuals in the domain of discourse satisfy an open formula. For instance, the universal quantifier ${\displaystyle \forall }$ in the first-order formula ${\displaystyle \forall xP(x)}$ expresses that everything in the domain satisfies the property denoted by ${\displaystyle P}$. On the other hand, the existential quantifier ${\displaystyle \exists }$ in the formula ${\displaystyle \exists xP(x)}$ expresses that there exists something in the domain which satisfies that property. A formula where a quantifier takes widest scope is called a quantified formula. A quantified formula must contain a bound variable and a subformula specifying a property of the referent of that variable.

The most commonly used quantifiers are ${\displaystyle \forall }$ and ${\displaystyle \exists }$. These quantifiers are standardly defined as duals; in classical logic: each can be defined in terms of the other using negation. They can also be used to define more complex quantifiers, as in the formula ${\displaystyle \neg \exists xP(x)}$ which expresses that nothing has the property ${\displaystyle P}$. Other quantifiers are only definable within second-order logic or higher-order logics. Quantifiers have been generalized beginning with the work of Andrzej Mostowski and Per Lindström.