Academic skepticism in the context of "Philo of Larissa"

⭐ In the context of Philo of Larissa, Academic skepticism is considered…

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⭐ Core Definition: Academic skepticism

Academic skepticism was the philosophy of the skeptical period of the Academy dating from around 266 BCE, when Arcesilaus became scholarch, until around 90 BCE, when Antiochus of Ascalon rejected skepticism, although individual philosophers, such as Favorinus and his teacher Plutarch, continued to defend skepticism after this date. Unlike the existing school of skepticism, the Pyrrhonists, they maintained that knowledge of things is impossible. Ideas or notions are never true; nevertheless, there are degrees of plausibility, and hence degrees of belief, which allow one to act. The school was characterized by its attacks on the Stoics, particularly their dogma that convincing impressions led to true knowledge. The most important Academics were Arcesilaus, Carneades, and Philo of Larissa. The most extensive ancient source of information about Academic skepticism is Academica, written by the Academic skeptic philosopher Cicero.

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👉 Academic skepticism in the context of Philo of Larissa

Philo of Larissa (Greek: Φίλων ὁ Λαρισαῖος Philon ho Larisaios; 159/8–84/3 BC) was a Greek philosopher. It is very probable that his actual name was "Philio."

He was a pupil of Clitomachus, whom he succeeded as head of the Academy. During the Mithridatic Wars which would see the destruction of the Academy, he travelled to Rome where Cicero heard him lecture. None of his writings survive. He was an Academic sceptic, like Clitomachus and Carneades before him, but he offered a more moderate view of skepticism than that of his teachers, permitting provisional beliefs without certainty.

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Academic skepticism in the context of Platonic Academy

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The Academy (Ancient Greek: Ἀκαδημία, romanizedAkadēmia) was founded by Plato in ca. 387 BC in Athens. Aristotle studied there for twenty years (367 BC – 347 BC) before founding his own school, the Lyceum. The Academy persisted throughout the Hellenistic period as a skeptical school, until coming to an end after the death of Philo of Larissa in 83 BC. Although philosophers continued to teach Plato's philosophy in Athens during the Roman era, it was not until AD 410 that a revived Academy was re-established as a center for Neoplatonism, persisting until 529 AD when it was closed down by Justinian I.

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Academic skepticism in the context of Middle Platonist

Middle Platonism is the modern name given to a revival and outgrowth of Platonic philosophy, lasting from about 90 BC – when Antiochus of Ascalon rejected the scepticism of the new Academy – until the development of neoplatonism under Plotinus in the 3rd century. Middle Platonism absorbed many doctrines from the rival Peripatetic and Stoic schools. The pre-eminent philosopher in this period, Plutarch (c. 45–120), defended the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul. He sought to show that God, in creating the world, had transformed matter, as the receptacle of evil, into the divine soul of the world, where it continued to operate as the source of all evil. God is a transcendent being, who operates through divine intermediaries, which are the gods and daemons of popular religion. Numenius of Apamea (c. 160) combined Platonism with neopythagoreanism and other eastern philosophies, in a move which would prefigure the development of neoplatonism.

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Academic skepticism in the context of Philosophical skepticism

Philosophical skepticism (UK spelling: scepticism; from Greek σκέψις skepsis, "inquiry") is a family of philosophical views that question the possibility of knowledge. It differs from other forms of skepticism in that it even rejects very plausible knowledge claims that belong to basic common sense. Philosophical skeptics are often classified into two general categories: Those who deny all possibility of knowledge, and those who advocate for the suspension of judgment due to the inadequacy of evidence. This distinction is modeled after the differences between the Academic skeptics and the Pyrrhonian skeptics in ancient Greek philosophy. Pyrrhonian skepticism is a practice of suspending judgement, and skepticism in this sense is understood as a way of life that helps the practitioner achieve inner peace. Some types of philosophical skepticism reject all forms of knowledge while others limit this rejection to certain fields, for example, knowledge about moral doctrines or about the external world. Some theorists criticize philosophical skepticism based on the claim that it is a self-refuting idea since its proponents seem to claim to know that there is no knowledge. Other objections focus on its implausibility and distance from regular life.

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Academic skepticism in the context of Hellenistic philosophy

Hellenistic philosophy is Ancient Greek philosophy corresponding to the Hellenistic period in Ancient Greece, from the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE to the Battle of Actium in 31 BCE. The dominant schools of this period were the Stoics, the Epicureans and the Skeptics.

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Academic skepticism in the context of Antiochus of Ascalon

Antiochus of Ascalon (/ænˈtəkəs/; Ancient Greek: Άντίοχος ὁ Ἀσκαλώνιος; c. 135/130 – c. 68 BC) was a 1st-century BC Platonist philosopher. He rejected skepticism, blended Stoic doctrines with Platonism, and wasthe first philosopher in the tradition of Middle Platonism.

Antiochus moved to Athens early in his life and became a pupil of Philo of Larissa at the Platonic Academy, but he went on to reject the prevailing Academic skepticism of Philo and his predecessors. This led to his resignation from the academy and the establishment of his own school, which he named the "Old Academy" as he claimed it was closer to original doctrines of Platonism that he believed had been betrayed by the skeptics of the New Academy under Philo. His students at this new institution included the Roman politicians Varro and Cicero. Antiochus was also the friend of the Roman politician and general Lucullus, whom he accompanied on a trip to North Africa and on a campaign to Armenia.

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Academic skepticism in the context of Acatalepsia

Acatalepsy (from the Greek α̉- 'privative' and καταλαμβάνειν 'to seize'), in philosophy, is incomprehensibleness, or the impossibility of comprehending or conceiving some or all things. The doctrine held by the ancient Skeptic philosophers, that human knowledge never amounts to certainty, but only to probability.

The Pyrrhonians attempted to show, while Academic skeptics of the Platonic Academy asserted an absolute acatalepsia; all human science or knowledge, according to them, went no further than to appearances and verisimilitude. It is the antithesis of the Stoic doctrine of katalepsis or Apprehension. According to the Stoics, katalepsis was true perception, but to the Skeptics, all perceptions were acataleptic, i.e. bear no conformity to the objects perceived, or, if they did bear any conformity, it could never be known.

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Academic skepticism in the context of Carneades

Carneades (/kɑːrˈnədz/; Greek: Καρνεάδης, Karneadēs, "of Carnea"; 214/3–129/8 BC) was a Greek philosopher, perhaps the most prominent head of the Skeptical Academy in Ancient Greece. He was born in Cyrene. By the year 159 BC, he had begun to attack many previous dogmatic doctrines, especially Stoicism and even the Epicureans, whom previous skeptics had spared.

As scholarch (leader) of the Academy, he was one of three philosophers sent to Rome in 155 BC where his lectures on the uncertainty of justice caused consternation among leading politicians. He left no writings. His ideas were passed on to us through his successor Clitomachus whose own books were lost but relayed to us indirectly in the writings of Cicero and Sextus Empiricus. He seems to have doubted the ability not just of the senses but of reason too in acquiring truth. His skepticism was, however, moderated by the belief that we can, nevertheless, ascertain probabilities (not in the sense of statistical probability, but in the sense of persuasiveness) of truth, to enable us to act.

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